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The emerging Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) concept assists at 
all levels of the supply chain in managing and mitigating risks, and the authors 
define C-SCRM as the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks 
associated with the distributed and interconnected nature of information and 
operational technology products and service supply chains.
 
As Special Operations Forces increasingly rely on sophisticated hardware and 
software products, this quick, well-researched monograph provides a detailed 
accounting of C-SCRM associated laws, regulations, instructions, tools, and 
strategies meant to mitigate vulnerabilities and risks—and how we might best 









ent                                C
raiger/C
raiger/Zorri
Alan Estevez, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, addresses U.S. Special Operations Command acquisition employees on current issues 
within the Department of Defense acquisition community during the Special Operations Forces 
Acquisition Summit held at U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL, 30 October 
2014. Photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant Angelita Lawrence. 
Cyber Supply Chain Risk 
Management: 
Implications for the SOF Future 
Operating Environment
J. Philip Craiger, Laurie Lindamood-Craiger, and 
Diane M. Zorri
JSOU Report 21-3
Joint Special Operations University
Isaiah “Ike” Wilson III, Ph.D., HQE, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret., President
Scott M. Guilbeault, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Vice President
Shannon P. Meade, Ph.D., Director, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies (IS3)
Christopher Marsh, Ph.D., Political Science, Director, Center for Strategic Research
Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor
Claire Luke, Part-time Editor and Layout Designer
IS3 Professors
Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.
Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.
David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics
A. Jackson, Ph.D., International Relations
Mark G. Grzegorzewski, Ph.D., Government
Joint Special Operations University and the  
Institute for SOF Strategic Studies (IS3)
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) generates, incubates, and propa-
gates (delivers and communicates) ideas, education, and training for expanding and 
advancing the body of knowledge on joint and combined special operations. JSOU is 
a ‘hybrid organization’ that performs a hybrid mission—we are a ‘corporate univer-
sity:’ an academic institution serving a professional service enterprise, ‘by, with, and 
through,’ the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). As such, we 
are both a direct reporting unit to the Commander, USSOCOM, on all Combined 
Joint Special Operations Forces (CJSOF) education and leader development matters, 
as well as the educational and leader development component of the Command.
The JSOU Mission is that JSOU prepares Special Operations Forces profession-
als to address strategic and operational challenges, arming them with the ability to 
think through problems with knowledge and insight. Our Vision is to constantly 
strive to be(come) USSOCOM’s “think-do tank,” world-class leader in “All Things” 
CJSOF strategic and operational education, training, and leader development, and 
the advancement of knowledge on the utility of CJSOF, for the Nation. We pursue 
this mission and vision through our best-practice teaching & learning, research 
& analysis (R&A), and engagement & service-outreach operations, activities, and 
initiatives. We achieve these outcomes-based goals by providing specialized joint 
professional military education, developing SOF-specific and unique undergraduate, 
graduate, and post-graduate-level equivalent curriculum, and by fostering special 
operations-focused R&A and outreach, in support of USSOCOM objectives and 
United States national and global strategic goals.
JSOU carries forward its R&A roles and responsibilities led by, and through its 
IS3, where our efforts are guided and informed by the most current U.S. National 
Security, Defense, and Military Strategies, and the USSOCOM Mission: USSOCOM 
develops and employs fully capable Special Operations Forces to conduct global special 
operations and activities as part of the Joint Force to support persistent, networked, 
and distributed global Combatant Commands operations and campaigns against state 
and non-state actors, to protect and advance U.S. policies and objectives.
Sharpening the Edge of SOF’s Advantage: The All-Domain SOF Leader-ProfessionalSharpening the Edge of SOF’s Advantage: The All-Domain SOF Leader-Professional
JSOU Press publications are available for download at 
https://jsoulibguides.com/jsoupublications. 
Print copies available upon request by writing 
jsou_research@socom.mil. 
JSOU Report 21 -3
The JSOU Press 
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
2021
Cyber Supply Chain Risk 
Management: 
Implications for the SOF Future 
Operating Environment
J. Philip Craiger, Laurie Lindamood-Craiger, 
and Diane M. Zorri
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press
Mazar-e Sharif: The First Victory of the 21st Century Against Terrorism, JSOU Report 
21-2, William Knarr, Mark Nutsch, and Robert Pennington
The Blurred Battlefield: The Perplexing Conflation of Humanitarian and Criminal 
Law in Contemporary Conflicts, JSOU Report 21-1, Patrick Paterson
Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative 
Analysis, JSOU Report 20-5, Diane Zorri, Houman Sadri, and David Ellis
Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs in Great Power Competition,  
JSOU Report 20-4, Travis Clemens
Informal Governance as a Force Multiplier in Counterterrorism: Evidence for Burkina 
Faso, JSOU Report 20-3, Margaret Ariotti and Kevin Fridy
Village Stability Operations and the Evolution of SOF Command and Control in 
Afghanistan: Implications for the Future of Irregular Warfare, JSOU Report 20-2,  
William Knarr and Mark Nutsch
On the cover. U.S. Marine Corps Corporal Railee Reed, a satellite controller with 
9th Communication Battalion, I Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group, 
operates a very small aperture terminal-large at Marine Corps Base Camp in Pend-
leton, California, on 25 February 2020. Photo by U.S. Marine Corps Lance Corporal 
Isaac Velasco.
Back cover. Alan Estevez, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisi-
tion, Technology and Logistics, addresses U.S. Special Operations Command acqui-
sition employees on current issues within the Department of Defense acquisition 
community during the Special Operations Forces Acquisition Summit held at U.S. 
Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL, 30 October 2014. Photo by U.S. Air 
Force Staff Sergeant Angelita Lawrence.
This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
April 2021.
ISBN 978-1-941715-51-2
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 
of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 
States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 
University.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to 
the Director, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies, Joint Special Operations 
University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.
*******
The JSOU Institute for SOF Strategic Studies is currently accepting written works 
relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information, please 
contact the Director, Institute for SOF Strategic Studies at jsou_research@socom.






About the Authors ..........................................................................xi
Introduction ................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1. Modern Warfighting Technologies and  
the Supply Chain Problem ............................................................. 7
Chapter 2. Supply Chains, Threats, and Mitigation Strategies ....... 13
Chapter 3. The SOF Supply Chain Problem .................................. 23
Chapter 4. Government Regulations for C-SCRM ......................... 37
Chapter 5. The Hyper-Enabled Operator (HEO) and  
the Supply Chain ......................................................................... 45
Chapter 6. SOF Acquisition ......................................................... 63






Advancements in information collection, communications, weapons, and their associated technologies have often propelled their wielding armies 
to extraordinary successes. These product advances and their supply chains 
have always required protections against exploitation, sabotage, and attack. 
In this monograph, the authors comprehensively describe this maxim as a 
requirement in today’s increasingly compounded environment, and nowhere 
is this more evident than in the Department of Defense (DOD) cyberspace 
supply chain. 
The authors have composed a well-researched monograph for laypersons, 
decision-makers, and leaders without technical government acquisition and 
procurement backgrounds. They examine the DOD’s cyber supply chain 
risk management (C-SCRM), demonstrating the real risk and vulnerability 
implications, current processes, policies, and associated risk-mitigating efforts 
currently underway. This research offers the reader a hypothetical, scenario-
based cyber-threat practical application exercise—identifying how special 
operators may become more resilient to cyber threats in their supply chain 
through awareness of potential adversary attack vectors across a product’s 
life cycle—and concluding with their thoughts on the future of special opera-
tions acquisitions. 
Advanced battlefield adaptations provide substantial force multipliers, and 
significantly contribute to improvements in force lethality, efficiency, and cost 
reductions. Across the military communications, command, and control’s 
global connectedness of today’s battlefield and tomorrow’s hyper-enabled 
operator (HEO)—with thousands of networked weapons and communication 
devices, sensors, and streaming data all containing a multitude of diverse, 
complex, and commercially available hardware and software—there is an 
ever-expanding reliance placed on the cyberspace domain. 
Through advances in communications technology, reductions in trade 
barriers, production and shipping costs, and an increase in international 
connections, the cyberspace vulnerabilities to military products and their 
supply chain have become progressively inherent in a product’s life cycle. 
From concept to disposal, product interaction with precarious and often 
murky supply chain realities—consisting of multiple tiers of outsourced 
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contractors, subcontractors, manufacturers, and material suppliers that are 
increasingly diversified, fluid, and global—and the DOD’s current acquisition 
strategies make it increasingly challenging to determine cyberspace risks in, 
or to, the delivered products. 
Modern warfare has transformed into blended—physical and cyber—
operations, and the supply chain is under increasing compromise by cyber 
threats. The stated compounding variables exponentially increase the poten-
tial exploitation of cyberspace product vulnerabilities by nefarious adversar-
ies. This access may readily concede product security, integrity, and operating 
capability and have profound implications for mission success. Given the 
enormity and gravity of these challenges, how can the DOD and other federal 
entities protect and secure their cyberspace supply chain against adversary 
hacking, exploitation, disruption, or destruction? 
As the authors adequately present, the notion of C-SCRM and resiliency is 
still a nascent and evolving concept; furthermore, they promote that C-SCRM 
is a distinct requirement originating from the U.S. government’s acquisition 
strategy—pivoting from program-specific to commercial off-the-shelf prod-
ucts for missions and systems.
The emerging C-SCRM concept assists at all levels of the supply chain 
in managing and mitigating risks, and the authors define C-SCRM as the 
process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with 
the distributed and interconnected nature of information and operational 
technology products and service supply chains. 
As Special Operations Forces increasingly rely on sophisticated hardware 
and software products, this quick, well-researched monograph provides a 
detailed accounting of C-SCRM associated laws, regulations, instructions, 
tools, and strategies meant to mitigate vulnerabilities and risks—and how we 
might best manage the evolving and ever-changing array of those vulner-
abilities and risks. 
Militaries will continue to evolve and seek out advanced software and 
hardware products, expanding their dependence on internet connectivity and 
cyberspace operations; therefore, we should expect everyone in the profession 
of arms to possess a basic understanding of C-SCRM. If the Cybersecurity 
Maturity Model, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, the 
Committee on National Security Systems, and the Cybersecurity & Acquisi-
tion Lifecycle Integration Tool are unfamiliar to the reader, this monograph 
will undoubtedly provide critical insights and lessons for those interested in 
ix
learning and subsequently contributing to this expanding and required field 
of study.
Mark Raney
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Introduction
Maersk is the world’s largest container shipping company, with more than 800 seafaring vessels—many of which are enormous container 
ships, carrying millions of tons of cargo yearly throughout the world. Maersk 
accounts for a fifth of the entire world’s shipping capacity.1 In June 2017, a 
single internet-connected computer residing on Maersk’s network became 
infected with a type of malware2 called ransomware. Encryption effectively 
corrupts the computer’s operating system and data files, rendering the com-
puter inoperable until the files are decrypted, which returns the files to their 
original state. The ransomware spread quickly across Maersk’s global infor-
mation technology (IT) infrastructure, encrypting hard drives across 170 
Maersk global offices, forcing recovery efforts to the entire IT infrastruc-
ture. Software and files were reinstalled on over 4,000 servers, 45,000 PCs, 
and 2,500 applications over a ten-day period.3 The spreading mechanism 
embedded in the ransomware exploited two vulnerabilities in versions of 
the Microsoft Windows operating system. The first was a vulnerability in a 
Windows file sharing protocol that allows Windows-based computers to read 
and write files to and from other Windows-based computers on the same 
network. The second vulnerability was that some versions of Windows were 
known to leave users’ passwords in the computer’s working memory, and 
therefore potentially accessible to a technically inclined malign actor.4 Once 
a single computer was infected, these vulnerabilities allowed the ransomware 
to automatically spread across Maersk’s IT global infrastructure, infecting 
computers in other offices throughout the world.
The ransomware attack resulted in the incapacitation of Maersk’s IT 
infrastructure; almost all office computers were inoperable, disrupting the 
company’s ability to accept shipping orders and stranding millions of tons 
of freight in transit. Port terminals in the United States, India, Spain, and 
the Netherlands—all run by Maersk—experienced massive disruptions.5 
Although the computers on the cargo container ships were not affected, 
Maersk’s office computers—most of which contained the logistics programs 
and information on their supply chain—were inoperable. Even when the 
container ships were able to dock at a port, the thousands of semi-trailer 
trucks that pick up and distribute cargo were unable to collect their cargo, 
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as there was no way of knowing which containers were on the ships or the 
cargo that was inside.6 
The origin of this event was speculated to be a by-product of a state-on-
state cyber offensive, part of the ongoing political conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine.7 The ransomware was cleverly designed to automatically spread 
across a network when a single computer is infected. Unfortunately, the 
ransomware’s spreading mechanism worked too well; it spread to computers 
on non-Ukrainian networks across the globe.8 Several other global compa-
nies were affected by the ransomware, including the pharmaceutical com-
pany Merck, FedEx, the French construction company Saint-Gobain, snack 
company Mondelēz, and British manufacturer Reckitt Benckiser.9 The U.S. 
government estimated that over $10 billion was lost due to the ransomware, 
and some have argued that figure was a conservative estimate.10
Of course, this does not tell the entire story of the effects of a ‘glitch’ in 
the supply chain. Clearly Maersk was affected, but also trucking companies, 
supply chain vendors waiting on the delivery of parts, distributors, and mil-
lions of customers and end-users. The intent of the malign actors was not to 
affect the supply chain, but the unintended side effects did just that. In the 
end it does not matter what the intent was, the effects on the supply chain 
were catastrophic. 
As warfighting technologies have increasingly integrated information 
communications technology (ICT)—sophisticated hardware and software—
there have been attendant changes in the worldwide supply chain.11 The 
supply chain has transformed dramatically over the last few decades. His-
torically, the DOD mission needs could be met primarily through program-
specific products—typically, custom designed and manufactured systems 
supplied by contractors. More recently and concurrent with advances in ICT, 
there has been a shift to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and open 
source software where feasible and practical, as well as an increased reliance 
on non-U.S. suppliers via a “globalized market.”12 While these changes have 
led to significant improvements in efficiency and cost-effectiveness for the 
DOD, these changes have produced greater risks for DOD missions.13 COTS 
products often rely on an even more complex and dynamic supply chain as 
smaller suppliers may change on an unpredictable basis. Custom weapons 
and support systems designed and built by contractors for specific mission 
needs most likely contain at least some COTS components (e.g., microelec-
tronic components, software libraries, etc.), and, potentially, components 
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from non-U.S. suppliers. Accordingly, the DOD’s current acquisition strat-
egy presents the prospect of emerging threats in the supply chain through 
cyber compromise—either through intentional acts by malign actors, or 
unintentional acts by suppliers. Consequently, the government has pur-
sued acquisition regulations and guidelines to assist in the mitigation and 
management of these threats. In this monograph, the authors describe the 
modernization of warfighting and the DOD’s increasing reliance on ICT; 
the changing nature of supply chains and threats due to cyber compromise 
and their potential impact on SOF missions; and current as well as emergent 
government acquisition regulations and guidelines to mitigate and manage 
cyber supply chain threats. 
Audience and Objectives
This monograph was written for a non-technical audience working with gov-
ernment acquisitions and procurement—including subcontractors, supply 
chain vendors, and risk managers. Additionally, decision makers in the 
supply chain—including those in acquisitions, cybersecurity, or IT—may 
find this monograph useful as it provides a context for the changing nature 
of supply chains; attendant cyber threats and risks; existing and emergent 
government guidelines and regulations affecting acquisition; and currently 
available tools to help mitigate risks for procurers and supply chain vendors. 
The authors will use the following framework to address issues regard-
ing supply chain threats and mitigation strategies, focusing on its effects on 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) mission readiness and capabilities: 
Chapter 1. Characterizes the modernization of warfighting and increased 
use of ICT, and the attendant changes in supply chains;
Chapter 2. Introduces the subject of supply chains, threats, and threat 
mitigation strategies, including the notion of C-SCRM;
Chapter 3. Analyzes the supply chain from a SOF perspective—threats to 
the SOF supply chain, including historical threats and attacks on supply 
chains, as well as ramifications of cyber compromise in the supply chain;
Chapter 4. Describes existing government regulations, as well as emer-
gent guidelines and regulations regarding government acquisition and 
procurement as a means of mitigating threats;
4
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Chapter 5. Presents a hypothetical scenario of a warfighter as part of a 
larger system of smart, portable, and network-connected devices on the 
battlefield, and potential cyber threats at each stage of the life cycle of 
the warfighting systems; 
Chapter 6. The authors discuss current SOF acquisition entities and 
practices, as well as other tools and emergent processes that can assist in 
securing the supply chain, as well as educating those involved in acquisi-
tion and procurement; 
Conclusions. The authors then conclude with a discussion of the future 
of SOF acquisition.
The primary research question is: How can special operators become 
more resilient to cyber threats in their supply chain? To answer this ques-
tion, the authors' research addresses threats to the cyber-resilience of the 
supply chain, the potential effects of cyber compromise on the warfighter, 
and how SOF can mitigate threats to their supply chain. To examine future 
uncertainties, the authors include a hypothetical scenario-based case study 
featuring the future, hyper-enabled warfighter as part of an integrated system 
comprised of smart, portable, network-connected technologies, addressing 
cyber threats at each stage of the system life cycle. This method allows the 
researcher to create plausible future scenarios based on a process-tracing of 
current technological trends, thereby showing a series of alternative poten-
tial events. Because technology changes so rapidly, the scenario-based case 
study methodology provides a logical framework for researching not only 
the threats and vulnerabilities, but also mitigation strategies. 
Definitions
Although this monograph was written for a non-technical audience, to 
provide accurate descriptions of cyber threats requires the use of cyber-
related terminology—some of which may be foreign to readers—yet likely 
to be encountered for those working in acquisition and procurement as 
government guidelines and regulations emerge to mitigate cyber threats. 
The authors provide, in the following, brief definitions of this terminology. 
These definitions level the bubble, making sure that everyone understands 
the terms used. 
5
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Cybersecurity: The process of protecting information and information 
systems by preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks. The objec-
tive is to reduce the likelihood that attackers can access DOD systems 
and limit the damage if they do.14
Vulnerability: A weakness in a system that could be exploited to gain 
access or otherwise affect the system’s confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability.15 Confidentiality involves limiting system and information access 
to authorized users and for authorized purposes only; integrity involves 
ensuring information and systems are not modified by unauthorized 
users and that the systems function as designed; and availability involves 
ensuring information and services are available to authorized users when 
needed.16
Threat: Anything that can exploit a vulnerability to damage or impede 
a system, either intentionally or unintentionally.17 
Attack vector: The path or means by which a malign actor exploits a vul-
nerability. Sometimes used synonymously with the term “threat vector.”
Exploit: A method of attack that takes advantage of a vulnerability in a 
system.
Cybersecurity risk: A function of the threat (intent and capabilities of the 
malign actor), vulnerabilities (inherent or introduced), and consequences 
(fixable or fatal).18 The extent to which a malign actor has the intent and 
capabilities, combined with existing vulnerabilities and consequences, 
will determine the amount of risk involved.
C-SCRM: The process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks 
associated with the distributed and interconnected nature of IT/opera-
tional technology (OT) product and service supply chains. It covers the 
entire life cycle of a system—including design, development, distribution, 
deployment, acquisition, maintenance, and destruction—as supply chain 
threats and vulnerabilities may intentionally or unintentionally compro-
mise an IT/OT product or service at any stage.19
Cyber resiliency: Involves identifying and protecting critical system ele-
ments during a cyberattack to ensure that they can continue to operate, 
possibly with limited capabilities.20
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Chapter 1. Modern Warfighting 
Technologies and the Supply Chain 
Problem
U.S. SOF are facing unprecedented changes to their operating environ-ment as sophisticated computer hardware and software have become 
increasingly important as force multipliers for SOF’s warfighting capabili-
ties. These technologies provide warfighters with enhanced resources sur-
passing technology of old; for instance, SOF’s fully integrated panoramic 
night-vision goggles have no analogue technology from the Vietnam War. 
Likewise, portable and lightweight communication systems permit satellite 
communications to warfighters in the field—a profound evolution from 
previous communications technologies. More recently, smart and portable 
network-connected devices are increasingly deployed by the DOD. These 
devices have robust applications that support information flow between 
warfighters, aircraft, naval vessels, unmanned aerial systems, and com-
mand posts, forming a unified network that increases situational awareness, 
response time, and risk assessment.21 
The Chief Scientist of the U.S. Army Research Lab coined the term Inter-
net of Battlefield Things (IoBT) for smart, portable, network-connected 
devices that will transform the future of warfighting:22
In the future, military operations will rely less on human soldiers 
and more on interconnected technology, leveraging advancements 
in unmanned systems and machine intelligence to achieve superior 
defense capabilities. The IoBT (Internet of Battlefield Things) will 
connect soldiers with smart technology in armor, radios, weapons, 
and other objects, to give troops “extra sensory” perception, offer 
situational understanding, endow fighters with prediction powers, 
provide better risk assessment, and develop shared intuitions.23
An early instance of IoBT involved U.S. Army helmets containing built-in 
sensors that transmitted sensed health data to physicians over networks to 
assist in diagnosing brain injuries.24 IoBT are increasingly deployed on the 
battlefield, and their role will continue to expand in future warfighting.25 
8
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Current and emergent warfighting technologies are composed of signifi-
cantly more diverse, complex, and commercially available hardware compo-
nents and software than any time in military history.26 The supply chain for 
these technologies may involve sourcing from a hierarchy of suppliers—from 
prime contractors, to Tier 1 through 4 subcontractors that provide hardware 
components, software, and services to upstream and downstream suppliers 
within the supply chain. Even lower tier suppliers, often small- and medium-
sized businesses, are reliant on a global supply chain network. 
Figure 1 is an illustrative yet oversimplified example of the complexities 
of the global supply chain.27 
As depicted in figure 1, the source of hardware components or software 
may not be evident to other participants within the supply chain. For exam-
ple, a procurer (e.g., Program Office) may only be able to identify the sources 
to which it is directly connected in the supply chain.28 Additionally, the 
intricacy of corporate structures can obfuscate the identity of downstream 
suppliers, such as when parent companies and their subsidiaries control busi-
nesses using different names in multiple countries, which further obscures 
the provenance of products.29 As such, the procurer may have little knowl-
edge of its downstream suppliers. Knowing the suppliers of your suppliers 
Figure 1. 21st Century Global Supply Chain. Derivative from Insight 
article created by authors.
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can be daunting: in 2017, U.S. defense contractor Raytheon was estimated 
to have 36,000 suppliers alone, and about 65 percent of those were also sup-
pliers for other major contractors such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and 
Northrop Grumman.30 The supply chain problem is further complicated 
when suppliers change on a unpredictable basis, such as when suppliers are 
acquired by or merged with another supplier—not unheard of for small- and 
medium-sized businesses—further obfuscating provenance. 
The difficulty of identifying the participants in the DOD supply chain 
results in the futility of not only identifying the provenance of hardware 
and software, but adherence by suppliers to DOD acquisition standards and 
regulations as well: 
DOD systems are exposed to threats of malicious insertion and 
tampering throughout the development and supply of critical com-
ponents from external and internal sources. This exposure is further 
exacerbated by the use of a significant number of COTS parts that 
are obtained through a global supply chain. Examples of malicious 
insertion threats are widely publicized and include telecommunica-
tion switches that exfiltrate data and radar systems that are unable 
to detect a particular country’s planes.31
Figure 2 displays the stages in the life cycle of a “product,” whether a hard-
ware component, software, or an integrated system.32 Due to the complexity 
of modern weapons systems, there may be many participants involved in 
the supply chain, exposing opportunities for cyber compromise.33 Between 
the inception of a component or a system and its final disposal, there are 
several stages in the life cycle where it can be altered, moved, shipped, tested, 
packaged, sold, used, and maintained. Likewise, components and systems 
can encounter several different handlers, engineers, testers, logisticians, con-
sumers, owners, and users during their life cycle. At each of these stages of 
the life cycle, there are opportunities for malign actors to interfere with the 
integrity of components or the systems themselves for malicious purposes. 
Figure 2. Supply Chain Product Life Cycle. Graphic created from data in 
Sandia Report by authors.
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Given the ubiquity and reliance on ICT in operational environments, 
support, suppliers, and supply chains are under constant and increasing 
threat of cyber compromise. State-of-the-art integrated weapons and support 
systems employed by SOF warfighters could potentially contain cyber vul-
nerabilities—in hardware and/or software—and therefore require new risk 
mitigation strategies.34 The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST)35 noted that cyber supply chain risks include insertion of counterfeit 
components,36 unauthorized production,37 tampering,38 theft,39 insertion of 
malicious software40 and hardware,41 and poor manufacturing and develop-
ment practices in the supply chain.42 The DOD has acknowledged issues with 
its supply chain in the last decade, where it was estimated that 15 percent of 
spare and replacement parts have been identified as counterfeit.43 Counterfeit 
electronic parts have been identified on U.S. Navy SH-60B helicopters, U.S. 
Air Force C-130J, U.S. Coast Guard C-27J cargo planes, and the U.S. Navy 
P-8A Poseidon aircraft.44 
The effects of a cyber supply chain vulnerability are not confined to the 
DOD; vulnerabilities can pass to federal agencies, enabling malign actors 
to exfiltrate data, insert malicious content, or otherwise exploit these vul-
nerabilities, potentially resulting in the compromise of federal information 
or missions.45 In response to threats to the cyber supply chain, the con-
cept of C-SCRM emerged to assist all tiers of the supply chain in manag-
ing and mitigating risks. The DOD established additional requirements for 
contractors which store, process, or transmit covered defense information 
and implemented the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) clause 252.204.7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and 
Cyber Incident Reporting.46 This clause was implemented by a rule released 
in December 2015 which mandated compliance by contractors. The clause 
required contractors and subcontractors to implement NIST Special Pub-
lication 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Non-
federal Information Systems and Organizations,47 which lists 110 security 
controls with which suppliers must be compliant, as well as implementing 
new rules regarding cyber incident reporting. Contractors risk losing their 
current federal contracts, and are potentially barred from future contracts 
for noncompliance.48 
In 2014, the NIST released Framework for Improving Critical Infrastruc-
ture Cybersecurity Version 1.0, and a revised Version 1.1 in 2018, referred to as 
the “Framework.”49 Although the Framework was designed to be voluntary, 
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it provides a method for organizations to measure and manage risks. Version 
1.1 implemented C-SCRM considerations and identified risks specific to the 
supply chain, as well as subcontracted parts and materials. 
The notion of C-SCRM and resiliency is still a nascent and evolving 
concept as supply chains become more complex, fluid, unpredictable, and 
globalized. In January 2020, the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment emphasized 
the supply chain risk when she stated: “[a]dversaries 
know that in today’s great power competition envi-
ronment, information and technology are both key 
cornerstones … and attacking a sub-tier supplier is 
far more appealing than a prime.”50 While the DFARS 
mandates compliance, many lower-tier suppliers—
often small- to medium-sized businesses—may be 
incapable of managing and meeting the require-
ments imposed by these regulations, in contrast to 
large, long-established, and therefore ostensibly more 
robust suppliers (e.g., Lockheed, Boeing, Raytheon, BAE Systems, General 
Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, etc.).51 But because of the risks inherent 
in the supply-chain, even these latter suppliers are not immune to cyber 
compromise.52
In 2017, The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force report Cyber Supply 
Chain noted the warfighters’ increasing reliance on sophisticated ICT-based 
weapons systems, and potential problems with the supply chain:
Modern weapons systems have depended on microelectronics since 
the inception of integrated circuits over fifty years ago. Today, most 
electronics contain programmable components of ever-increasing 
complexity. At the same time, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
has become a far less influential buyer in a vast, globalized supplier 
base. Consequently, assuring that defense electronics are free from 
vulnerabilities is a daunting task.53
As in the past, weapon systems will continue to leverage the latest tech-
nologies. Modernization requires increases in system complexity, meaning 
more physical hardware components and more complex components.54 But 
system complexity is not only defined by the number of physical hardware 
The notion of 
C-SCRM and 
resiliency is still 
a nascent and 
evolving concept 






JSOU Report 21 -3
components or their complexity; equally important is the software that 
defines the system’s functionality:
For many if not most DOD systems, software now defines function. 
Software increasingly determines the boundaries, operation, and 
risks to systems relied upon by all facets of civil society—consumer-
facing, industrial, transportation, energy, healthcare, communica-
tions—as well as defense missions and management. Increasingly, 
functionality is achieved through software. A modern aircraft may 
have more than 10 million lines of code. The initial Block 1A/1B 
F-35 had more than 8.3 million lines of code, and later version of 
the aircraft will have more than 20 million lines of code for both 
operations and support. Combat systems of all types increasingly 
employ sensors, actuators, and software-activated control devices.55
Software is the computer instructions that connects weapon system’s 
components, subsystems, and sensors.56 Some hardware components may be 
designed for specific uses—e.g., microelectronics for a specialized heads-up 
display. Other hardware are general purpose systems—e.g., COTS laptop 
computers, smartphones, etc.—which might be composed of specific-use 
components. Nonetheless, hardware systems cannot function unless software 
is written to make use of the hardware’s capabilities.
Modernization introduces complexity into weapons systems in terms 
of the number and complexity of hardware components, lines of software 
code, as well as the complexity of the code. In concert, the supply chain for 
hardware and software is increasingly diversified, fluid, and global. Conse-
quently, there is concurrent increase in the attack surface for weapons and 
support systems, meaning more and varied opportunities for malign actors 
to attack the systems through hardware and/or software, through multiple 
channels in the supply chain, and through all stages of a system’s life cycle 
shown in figure 2.57 
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Chapter 2. Supply Chains, Threats, and 
Mitigation Strategies
For the purposes of this research, when describing supply chain and supply chain management (SCM), the authors use a widely cited defini-
tion proposed by Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler, Min, Nix, Smith, and Zacharia 
in the Journal of Business Logistics.58 They defined the supply chain as a “set 
of three or more entities (organizations or individuals) directly involved in 
the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/or 
information from a source to a customer.”59 Meanwhile, they define SCM as:
The systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional business 
functions and the tactics across these business functions within a 
particular company and across businesses within the supply chain, 
for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the 
individual companies and the supply chain as a whole.60 
Increases in the use of non-U.S. suppliers via a globalized market, and 
the rise of ICT, has triggered rapid changes in the way businesses operate 
within their supply chains.61 Virtual distance reduction, interactivity, dis-
intermediation among supply chain participants, and the development of 
new businesses—especially around digital product using the internet—has 
significantly affected SCM. Additionally, an increasing reliance on the Inter-
net of Things (IoT), small network connected computing devices—which 
are covered in depth later in this monograph—have allowed for increasing 
integration within supply chains of processes, people, and things.62 Modern 
supply chains include contractors, suppliers, manufacturers, trading firms, 
and transport firms that work in tandem in online networks, blurring the 
lines between organizations.63 Geographic networks are now more diverse, 
with more suppliers involved, and these supply chains move both tangible 
and intangible assets—which can be prone to disruption.64 Accordingly, 
operations structures are needed to manage risks including reputational, 
intellectual property, and liability to maintain continuity of supplies.65 The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted the complexity and chal-
lenges of the federal ICT and communications supply chain:
14
JSOU Report 21 -3
Federal information and communications systems can include a 
multitude of IT equipment, products, and services, each of which 
may rely on one or more supply chains. These supply chains can be 
long, complex, and globally distributed and can consist of multiple 
tiers of outsourcing. As a result, agencies may have little visibility 
into, understanding of, or control over how the technology that 
they acquire is developed, integrated, and deployed, as well as the 
processes, procedures, and practices used to ensure the integrity, 
security, resilience, and quality of the products and services.66
The conclusion can be drawn that disruption to the stability of the supply 
chain can lead to undesirable consequences to the operational readiness of 
DOD services—and more specifically, to SOF—because the more critical a 
product is to mission success, the greater the consequences for any disrup-
tions in the end-to-end supply chain, resulting in second and third-order 
effects on mission outcomes.67 
The very benefits of the global interconnected supply chain—rapid inno-
vation, interoperability, low-cost, and product features—are the very things 
that leave it vulnerable to supply chain compromises, whether intentional 
or unintentional.68 To properly manage the supply chain, it is necessary for 
participants in the supply chain 
to ensure the quality, integrity, 
security, and resilience of supply 
chain services and products to 
prevent the introduction of 
cyber supply chain risks such as 
unauthorized production, theft, 
insertion of counterfeits, tam-
pering, introduction of mali-
cious hardware and software—and the risks presented when firms in the 
cyber supply chain have poor development and manufacturing practices.69
As the supply chain underwent major transformations with the emer-
gence and evolution of ICT, initial concerns regarding cyber security at the 
federal level began surfacing in the 1990s—specifically, how U.S. national 
security interests could be damaged due to the use of the internet and tele-
communication systems.70 The electronic information systems supported 
a wide range of activities, both in the private and public sectors, and these 
The very benefits of the global 
interconnected supply chain—rapid 
innovation, interoperability, low-cost, 
and product features—are the very 
things that leave it vulnerable to 
supply chain compromises, whether 
intentional or unintentional.
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information infrastructures supported a wide variety of economic and secu-
rity assets.71 
In 2013, C-SCRM was identified as a distinct need due to changes in the 
U.S. government’s acquisition strategy, with the government pivoting from 
program-specific products to COTS products for missions and systems.72 
This fact, combined with increased access to non-U.S. supply chain sources, 
provided the U.S. government an opportunity to buy the best products at 
lower prices.73 However, as the global ICT supply chain became more inter-
connected, it introduced the risk of malign actors exploiting these systems.74 
While the COTS acquisition strategy lowered costs, the reduced visibility 
and control throughout the life cycle of the supply chain led to an increased 
risk of compromised components which could have malicious elements, be 
counterfeit, or be flawed in some other way.75 The DOD’s increasing reliance 
on ICT could lead to system vulnerabilities, allowing information such as 
inventory or troop strength to be accessed by a malign actor—which could, 
for example, negatively impact SOF mission outcomes.76 How then to best 
manage this evolving and ever-changing risk?
C-SCRM
C-SCRM is an emerging area of both research and practice, and joins SCM, 
risk management, and cybersecurity, incorporating practices from these 
fields to manage the risks associated with the global interconnected supply 
chain. In response to the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 
(CNCI) #11—which addressed C-SCRM for non-national security informa-
tion systems—NIST developed C-SCRM best practices with input from 
academia, industry, and government. 
The CNCI was established under President George W. Bush in January 
2008, by the National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-D54/HSPD-23), but was kept confidential at 
the time.77 The CNCI flowed from the 2003 Bush administration National 
Strategy for Security Cyberspace policy, which recognized the existence 
of cyber threats, and the need for a coordinated national response.78 The 
administration established the CNCI to better protect agency networks 
from malign actors such a foreign nation state, as well as from non-state 
technical malign actors.79 The CNCI also worked to unify fragmented federal 
agencies response to reduce the risks of threats to government networks.80 
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At the time, the CNCI consisted of 12 components to improve the govern-
ment’s cybersecurity by formalizing existing procedures and introduce new 
business practices and policies to better protect government networks.81 
Limited information emerged that one of the components of the CNCI was 
to address the risk of malicious hardware and software that could be inserted 
into a product or into a contractor’s network to allow malign actors a view 
into the government’s data.82
In March 2010, President Barack Obama released a sanitized version of 
the CNCI that was subsequently published on the White House’s website.83 
One of the CNCI’s core goals was “to defend against the full spectrum of 
threats by enhancing U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and increasing 
the security of the supply chain for key information technologies.”84 CNCI 
#11 specifically identified the risk that globalization of the ICT presented 
opportunities for malign actors to use the supply chain to gain access to 
data, interrupt communications, or alter data.85 Furthermore, the CNCI 
acknowledged that the global supply chain must be managed over the entire 
life cycle of services, products, and systems in comprehensive and strategic 
ways—and that managing this risk required greater attention to vulner-
abilities, threats, and consequences of acquisition decisions.86 CNCI #11 also 
called for the development and use of resources and tools to mitigate risk 
both technically and operationally across product life cycles from design to 
retirement.87 The CNCI also recognized the importance of the acquisitions, 
calling for new policies and practices that mirror the global market place 
complexities.88
Concurrent with the government’s recognition of the need for C-SCRM, 
there were growing calls for increased attention and research on C-SCRM. 
There was a general recognition that C-SCRM was not widely understood by 
academia or industry, and while C-SCRM was rapidly evolving, it was still a 
nascent area of risk management research. While C-SCRM has its roots in 
ICT management, there was growing recognition that risks expand beyond 
ICT systems, requiring a merging of perspectives within the C-SCRM dis-
cipline. Academics recognized that C-SCRM bridged multiple disciplines 
and practices: “[t]he cybersecurity problem does not fit conventional or tra-
ditional security categories based on individual security responsibilities, 
economic or corporate security issues, military security problems, as well 
as domestic versus international problems.”89 
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The academic literature has provided C-SCRM models that have evolved 
over time, and it is helpful to review the literature to understand how cur-
rent definitions of C-SCRM were derived. As early as 2010, collaborative 
efforts between industry, academia, and government resulted in an early 
risk management framework (RMF) to address risks within the electronics 
supply chain.90 The framework created a typology for the four types of risks 
and mitigation strategies within the electronics supply chain: 
1. If a firm is attacked by malign actors, the firm’s operational capabili-
ties may be at risk. 
2. If malign actors can infect computer systems with malware, a firm’s 
operation and its data can be compromised. 
3. In the event of an attack, the reputation of a firm and the trustworthi-
ness of the firm are both at risk. 
4. The existence of the firm itself is at stake if there is a loss of control or 
competitive information.
Several strategies have been offered to address supply chain risks.91 First, 
production should be mandatory and continual with alternate production 
sources maintained to ensure continuity within the supply chain and avoid 
the interruption of operations.92 Second, strict controls should be used to 
guard against malware threats and the associated risks of corruption to 
intellectual property.93 Third, seals should be used on electronic products, 
and containers should be tracked and sealed as well to prevent tamper-
ing. Fourth, operational logs should be implemented to assist in identifying 
responsible parties to help maintain trust.94 Finally, versioning control can 
be used to prevent loss of information and intellectual property.95 The strate-
gies used to manage risks relate various stages in the supply chain including 
design, fabrication, assembly, and distribution. While simple, this was an 
early approach to addressing and managing emerging supply chain risks. 
Other researchers expanded beyond electronics products and focused 
on the risks associated with enterprise SCM information systems—focusing 
on the early IT implementation of these systems—and noting that interrup-
tions to these systems could cause business losses.96 For example, a “lessons 
learned” approach was used to create a RMF that integrated elements from 
IT, supply chain, and risk management, and further identified the need for 
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information confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.97 Due to its narrow 
focus on implementation, this framework did not address life cycle C-SCRM. 
Other research in this field used risk mitigation factors to determine 
and assess threats.98 For instance, product criticality should be considered 
because risks introduced in the end-to-end global supply chain can have an 
impact on mission success.99 Threats and vulnerabilities should be identified 
and prioritized, and countermeasures to mitigate risks identified.100 Then 
firms can identify how best to allocate resources for risk mitigation using a 
return-on-investment approach. 
Given the increasing diffusion of software and hardware systems in the 
supply chain, some have argued for a need to view C-SCRM as a blended dis-
cipline.101 Within a company, IT department goals—such as cutting costs—
may be at odds with other organizational goals, and structural integration of 
the supply chain does not occur.102 Consequently, C-SCRM should combine 
not only SCM and cybersecurity, but also incorporate enterprise-level risk 
management practices.103 
Nuances exist between the terms IT, cybersecurity, SCM, and C-SCRM.104 
C-SCRM expands IT’s role beyond the firm itself, to include Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 partners in the supply chain in order to provide greater control and 
insight.105 Cybersecurity focuses on finding technical solutions for cyber 
threats, whereas C-SCRM also consid-
ers broader supply chain disruptions and 
integrates broader perspectives such as 
human factors and management.106 Enter-
prise risk management typically focuses 
on the top-down control of the business’s 
environment, and C-SCRM redirects this 
focus to include the sometimes hidden, 
but adaptive dynamic and global supply 
chain.107
In 2011, the notion of a research-based capability/maturity model for 
C-SCRM emerged.108 The federal government created a focus group of 19 
participants, including the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Security Agency (NSA), 
the DOD, and major suppliers to discuss the inception of a C-SCRM capa-
bility/maturity model.109 The focus group’s findings were combined with 
other research to create a cyber supply chain framework. Subsequently, the 
Cybersecurity focuses on 
finding technical solutions 
for cyber threats, whereas 
C-SCRM also considers 
broader supply chain disrup-
tions and integrates broader 
perspectives such as human 
factors and management.
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government studied sixty public and private-sector organizations to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of these organization’s C-SCRM standards and policy 
initiatives in addressing end-to-end supply chain risks.110 The organizations’ 
initiatives were reviewed to determine how much they addressed each tier’s 
key attributes using a three-tiered framework, which considered systems 
integration, governance, and operations.111 The research findings suggested 
that the organizations’ C-SCRM supplier-sourcing activities were found 
only for key suppliers, meaning that organizations had little visibility or 
knowledge of downstream suppliers.112 
The focus group then created a C-SCRM capability/maturity model that 
identified and classified practices as average, more advanced, or leading edge, 
and then linked to the system integration, governance, and operations tiers.113 
The model acknowledged that C-SCRM practices and performance could 
then be categorized as emergent, diligent, and proficient in regard to the status 
of the implementation of C-SCRM practices, and accordingly, if practices 
were not implemented, but were planned, the organization would be consid-
ered emergent.114 If an organization was in the early stages of implementation 
with ongoing implementation efforts, the organization would be considered 
diligent. Organizations rated proficient would have process improvements 
across the supply chain, and the implementation would be well-established.115
Others observed that while IT has the capability to maximize SCM, it 
also opens organizations to vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malign 
actors and therefore require cyber resilience strategies.116 This approach had 
a narrower technical focus to managing cyber supply chain risks, focusing 
on IT-based platforms to address cyber supply chain risks and maintaining 
cyber resilience using cost-effective, push/pull services.117 It was advocated 
that all parties—both industry and government—have data access in the 
supply chain that is common and reliable.118 Pull services provide a way for 
a supply chain organization to evaluate supply chain elements such as inven-
tory levels of a supplier, shipment location, or even traffic conditions using 
data pulled from integrated systems and are more suitable for managing 
their supply chains.119 Push services permit organizations to send alerts such 
inventory level or demand if unanticipated changes occur and address risk 
and supply chain resiliency.120 
Academics also investigated the idea of managing C-SCRM using an IT 
systems engineering approach.121 Firms across the supply chain, including 
end-user organizations such as SOF, may have different understandings of 
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risk management objectives and different abilities to define and manage cyber 
supply chain risks.122 Organizations within the supply chain may be motivated 
by differing risks tolerances and appetites, and therefore make trade-offs in 
C-SCRM accordingly, without considering other parts of the supply chain.123 
To address this issue, C-SCRM stakeholders introduced systems engineering 
concepts into the management of cyber supply chain risks, including security, 
safety, reliability, trustworthiness, and quality.124 
Some have made the case that C-SCRM must include additional functions 
beyond IT due to the multiple potential failure points in the supply chain.125 These 
areas include supply chain continuity from product sourcing, management of 
suppliers, security, quality, and transportation. Additional functional manage-
ment areas needed to manage cyber requirements include human resources, 
strategy governance and controls, processes and standards, regulation and law, 
research and development (R&D), supplier management, manufacturing, verifi-
cation, audit, defects, secure delivery of services, and vulnerability resolution.126
Other researchers recommended a tiered maturity/capability model to 
manage cyber supply chain risks, but expanded the organization’s activity to 
downstream suppliers, consumers, and organizations.127 In this approach, ad-hoc 
risk management characterizes Tier I as initial organizations, and these organiza-
tions partially follow C-SCRM practices.128 Management approval of C-SCRM 
practices characterize Tier II as managed organizations—but operationally, 
implementation of these practices may not occur and there is not repeatable 
risk assessment.129 As with Tier II, organizations with approved management 
practice characterize Tier III as defined organizations, but at this tier, repeat-
able risk assessment occurs and agreements and communications with the gov-
ernment, suppliers, and consumers have been established.130 Organizational 
implementation of the highest level of C-SCRM practices characterizes Tier IV 
as optimizing organizations, with continuous process improvement occurring 
as well.131 Further, at this level real-time risk management occurs, and there is 
coordination of C-SCRM with other consumers, suppliers, and organizations.132
Some researchers examined C-SCRM from the perspective of operations 
and supply chain management and the challenges of preserving digital confi-
dentiality.133 With greater systems integration comes a need for organizations to 
understand the risks they face with this integration.134 Accordingly, C-SCRM is 
seen as not just an activity that occurs within IT, but as something that also needs 
to be incorporated in all business operations daily. The ability to maintain digital 
confidentiality increasingly drives a firm’s viability and reputation—however, 
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maintaining digital confidentiality can be in tension with increased system inte-
gration.135 The Occupational Classification System Manual literature identifies 
high levels of digital integration among organizations within the supply chain 
but does not consider the attendant risks this creates for firms trying to maintain 
digital confidentiality, presenting a dichotomy between supply chain practice 
and the literature.136
Other researchers identified IT supply chain risks as micro risk within a larger 
supply chain risk management (SCRM) framework.137 Macro risks for SCRM 
are relatively rare events, e.g., earthquakes or war, while micro risks refer to the 
relatively routine activities that occur within an organization or its business 
partners.138 Both macro and micro risks—including IT disruptions—should 
be managed in a continuous manner.139 A four-phase approach was proposed 
to manage cyber supply chain risk: identification, assessment, mitigation, and 
monitoring.140 
The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 required NIST 
to provide agencies with the standards and guidelines needed to improve infor-
mation security.141 As a result, NIST has taken a lead role for the federal govern-
ment in consolidating a definition of C-SCRM—by taking a multi-disciplinary 
approach to defining cyber terminology, and recommending strategies to deal 
with cyber risks using input from government, industry, and academia.142 
While NIST provides a suitable definition of C-SCRM, the GAO noted that 
additional supply chain vulnerabilities can occur in “agency acquisition or secu-
rity procedures, controls, or implementation related to an information system.”143 
These vulnerabilities provide opportunities for malign actors to exploit the supply 
chain. The GAO identified three categories of vulnerabilities in IT acquisitions: 
(1) gray markets, (2) distributors, and (3) independent brokers who are not the 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or an authorized reseller; those three 
categories are all present risks in IT acquisitions. Another category of vulner-
ability exists in software updates and patches that have been inadequately tested. 
Finally, the GAO acknowledged that there may be inadequate information on 
suppliers of IT systems. These supply chain vulnerabilities, if compromised, 
present risks to end users such as SOF, a point made by the GAO:
If a threat actor exploits an existing vulnerability, it could lead to 
the loss of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the system 
and associated information. This, in turn, can adversely affect an 
agency’s ability to carry out its mission.144 
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Chapter 3. The SOF Supply Chain Problem
SOF weapons and support systems procurement relies on a complex, dynamic, and sometimes unpredictable supply chain, with multiple tiers 
of vendors supplying hardware, software, and services to upstream suppliers 
and prime contractors in a complex chain of relationships. The life cycle of a 
SOF weapons system can be years-long, from the initial concept and design, 
to manufacture, deployment, maintenance, and at the end, disposal. Each life 
cycle stage presents additional opportunities for cyber compromise. Cyber 
compromise need not be intentional acts by malign actors. Unintentional acts 
by suppliers, such as lack of due diligence, or inferior design, manufacturing, 
and system testing practices, can also result 
in vulnerabilities and system compromise. 
Regardless of intent, vulnerabilities must be 
identified, addressed, and mitigated. 
Vulnerabilities may be persistent and 
not apparent even after rigorous testing of 
hardware components and software. For 
instance, software development requires 
testing to confirm that software supports the 
functionality specified in the requirements 
and design stages. Unless the source code has been thoroughly reviewed 
by programmers or software engineers, what is not apparent is the answer 
to the question “what else does the software do?” It is difficult to identify 
hidden functionality in compiled code,145 and this hidden functionality may 
“execute” under certain specific conditions or a set time. For example, in 
2002 a disgruntled employee successfully deployed a logic bomb against 
UBS PaineWebber, his employer, after a dispute over his annual bonus.146 The 
employee installed the logic bomb on 2,000 computers across 400 offices, and 
set it to execute on 4 March 2002, at 9:30 a.m., whereupon it would delete 
files on UBS servers and backup systems. On the appointed date and time, 
the logic bomb executed, leaving over 17,000 brokers unable to make trades.147 
From a DOD perspective, persistent, latent vulnerabilities can lead to mis-
sion failure in modern weapons systems, and the cause may be difficult to 
distinguish from normal electronic or mechanical failure.148 
Unintentional acts by 
suppliers, such as lack of 
due diligence, or inferior 
design, manufacturing, 
and system testing prac-
tices, can also result in 
vulnerabilities and system 
compromise.
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Hardware must also be subjected to testing, yet, it has the same issues as 
software in terms of the potential for persistent, undetected vulnerabilities. 
Even after extensive testing, vulnerabilities may not be identified until years 
later. For example, in March 2020 a team of academics identified vulnerabili-
ties in AMD Central Processing Units (CPUs)149 that were sold from 2011 to 
2019.150 The vulnerabilities could theoretically allow a malign actor to exfil-
trate information from the CPU. CPUs from another major manufacturer, 
Intel, were also found to contain two similar vulnerabilities, one of which 
dated back to 1995.151 As discussed later, identifying cyber vulnerabilities 
with hardware is just as difficult as with software, and presents a malign 
actor with opportunities for cyber compromise.
The nature of modern warfare has changed dramatically because of evolv-
ing and emergent ICT-based technologies.152 No longer are adversaries engag-
ing the U.S. solely via kinetic means; they have moved to asymmetric warfare 
with “blended operations that take place through the supply chain, cyber 
domain, and human elements.”153 Malign actors can and do use multiple 
attack vectors to trigger operational effects, thereby increasing the potential 
for mission disruption. Four primary attack vectors used in asymmetric 
blended operations include:154 
• supply chain attacks through hardware, software, or services
• cyber-physical system (CPS) attacks through weapons systems or 
industrial control systems
• cyber IT attacks through IT 
• human domain attacks through insiders, foreign intelligence services, 
or witting/unwitting actors
Although the preceding list of attack vectors separates supply chain as 
its own category, the three remaining attack vectors can also play a part 
within the supply chain, and therefore will be addressed accordingly. The 
human domain is also divided into several subcategories, given that there are 
multiple critical attack vectors within that category. The following discusses 
each attack vector and provide descriptions of potential cyber threats as well 
as historical examples of attacks. 
Supply Chain Attack Vector
As noted earlier, each stage of the product life cycle presents new oppor-
tunities for cyber compromise by a malign actor—such as inserting a 
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vulnerability or malicious functionality—or unintentional acts by insid-
ers as the result of poor design, manufacturing, and/or testing practices 
by suppliers. Regarding the former, consider a hardware implant inserted 
into microelectronics by a malign actor during the manufacturing stage. A 
hardware implant is an extra component that is manufactured into micro-
electronics that provides functionality not specified in the requirements 
or design stages. This extra component might, for instance, allow a malign 
actor to gain unauthorized access to a weapon or support system through 
a backdoor, permitting the actor to access, add, modify, or delete critical 
functionality or data stored on the device.155 
In 2018, Bloomberg Business reported on the result of over a yearlong 
investigation into a hardware implant allegedly traced to China.156 The 
implant involved a supply chain attack by the Chinese motherboard157 
manufacturing company Supermicro, Inc.158 The story starts in 2015 when 
Amazon considered acquiring Elemental, a company that develops and sells 
hardware and software for compressing large video files. Elemental’s video 
compression servers at the time were assembled by Supermicro, one of the 
largest motherboard suppliers in the world, with Elemental being only one 
of hundreds of Supermicro customers. Although Supermicro had several 
production facilities throughout the world, including California, Taiwan, 
and the Netherlands, Chinese contractors manufactured their motherboards. 
In 2015, Elemental shipped several of these servers for testing to an inde-
pendent third-party cybersecurity company. The security company identified 
a small microchip, no larger than a grain of sand, that was not a part of the 
motherboard’s original design specification. The finding was reported to 
U.S. governmental authorities, causing alarm as the motherboards had been 
purchased by numerous commercial and government entities. Particularly 
concerning was that the motherboards were deployed on U.S. Navy warships, 
as well as within the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) drone operations. 
This finding started a multi-year classified government investigation into 
Supermicro and its motherboards.
The government conducted further testing to identify the chip’s func-
tionality. The chip was connected to the baseboard management controllers, 
which are tiny computing devices connected to servers to provide com-
puter administrators remote access to the device to troubleshoot or restart 
the system remotely. Given its location, it was surmised that the microchip 
served as a backdoor to the systems on which the motherboard was installed. 
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Sources not identified by Bloomberg further asserted that the implants had 
been installed during the manufacturing process by operatives from the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army. 
The investigation identified 30 companies that had purchased the con-
taminated motherboards, including Apple Inc., a major bank, and several 
government contractors. As reported by Bloomberg, further research by 
Apple Inc. confirmed the hardware implants on the motherboards purchased 
from Supermicro, and in 2015, Apple severed ties with Supermicro. Supermi-
cro denied all allegations. Some security researchers expressed doubts about 
the allegations regarding the functionality of the implant as unnecessarily 
complex, cumbersome, and easily accomplished with software or firmware 
instead.159,160 Meanwhile, others have expressed skepticism at the Bloomberg 
report, including the NSA.161 
CPS Attack Vector
CPS are smart systems that include interacting networks of physical and 
computational components.162 ICT-based modern weapons systems are prime 
examples of CPS. A 2018 GAO report described persistent and ongoing prob-
lems with DOD weapons system’s cybersecurity:
Multiple factors contribute to the current state of DOD weapon 
systems cybersecurity, including: the increasingly computerized and 
networked nature of DOD weapons, DOD’s past failure to prioritize 
weapon systems cybersecurity, and DOD’s nascent understanding 
of how best to develop more cyber secure weapon systems. Spe-
cifically, DOD weapon systems are more software and IT depen-
dent and more networked than ever before. This has transformed 
weapon capabilities and is a fundamental enabler of the United 
States’ modern military capabilities. Yet this change has come at a 
cost. More weapon components can now be attacked using cyber 
capabilities. Furthermore, networks can be used as a pathway to 
attack other systems.163
The GAO report noted that from 2012 to 2017, DOD security testers rou-
tinely identified critical cyber vulnerabilities in almost all of the weapon 
systems under development.164 The testers used well-known penetration test-
ing techniques and easily obtainable penetration testing tools.165 The testers 
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seized control of these systems and were able to largely remain undetected 
by the system’s operators. When a system operator identified an intrusion, 
in some cases, the operator was unable to effectively respond to the intru-
sion. The report noted that a two-person team gained initial access to a 
weapons system in under an hour, and in a day the team was able to esca-
late privileges to take full control of the weapons system.166 After escalating 
privileges, testers were able to move through the system unimpeded and 
unnoticed. In one instance testers were able to view in real-time what the 
operators were viewing on their console and could manipulate the system’s 
controls. Additionally, multiple penetration testing teams were able to copy, 
modify, or delete system data—including one team that downloaded over 
100 gigabyte (GB) of data. Perhaps most disturbing, one team noted that 
performing a simple passive scan caused a weapons system to shut down.167 
Another team reported they were able to guess the system’s administrator 
password in nine seconds. Some of the weapons systems incorporated COTS 
and open-source software that had not been reconfigured with new pass-
words to replace default passwords shipped with the system. This allowed 
testers to search the internet to identify the default passwords, which the 
testers subsequently used to gain access and control the systems. 
Note that the DOD cybersecurity testers were conducting “friendly” 
cybersecurity tests in this case, causing no actual damage. Moreover, these 
vulnerabilities were not alleged to have been inserted by malign actors, but 
likely the result of poor design, manufacturing, and/or testing practices by 
the DOD suppliers. Again, intent does not matter—the fact that systems 
supplied by DOD vendors contained multiple cyber vulnerabilities is con-
cerning. Malign actors, given the same opportunities, would undoubtedly 
exploit the systems to take full advantage of the vulnerabilities to degrade 
warfighters’ capabilities. 
Cyber-IT Attack Vector
The fastest growing technologies involve devices contributing to the IoT. 
These are smart sensor-enabled computing devices that coordinate and com-
municate over the internet. Common household examples of IoT devices 
include home assistant speakers, smart thermostats, smart wall plugs, light 
bulbs, light switches, home energy monitors, house door locks, pet feeders, 
children’s toys, baby monitors, smart electric meters, smart watches and 
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phones, fitness trackers, smart refrigerators, washers and dryers, micro-
waves, smart TVs, and the ubiquitous home security camera, to list a few. 
Statista Research predicted over 75 billion IoT devices will be connected to 
the internet by 2025.168 
As noted in the introduction, IoBT devices are increasingly deployed 
by the DOD as they have robust applications that allow information flow 
between aircraft, naval vessels, unmanned aerial systems, warfighters, and 
command posts, creating a unified network that increases situational aware-
ness, risk assessment, and response time.169 However, there are noted issues 
with the use of IoT. The Chief Information Officer of the DOD indicated in a 
2016 report, DOD Policy Recommendations for IoT, that the growing deploy-
ment of IoT devices on DOD networks increases the opportunities for cyber 
compromise by malign actors:170
IoT is already upon us, with millions of these devices already 
installed in our facilities, vehicles, and medical devices. The newest 
DoD green buildings have tens of thousands of sensors. The growth 
of internet-connected medical devices has been similarly exploding. 
IoT devices have the potential to be incorporated in our weapons 
and intelligence systems (both intentionally and unintentionally). 
… However, the immense promise of this technology comes with 
immense risks. While there have always been risks to DoD sensors 
and controls, their proprietary nature and isolation limited the pos-
sibility of attack. Now, with such capabilities being given Internet 
access, DoD is entering a quickly deepening pool of vulnerability. 
At risk are all the things that embrace the Internet of Things (IoT): 
DoD facilities, equipment, employees, and their possessions—any 
of which could be used to cause harm.171 
The report noted that IoT devices expand the DOD’s cyber-attack surface 
through two means relevant to the supply chain. First, many DOD suppli-
ers employ IoT devices during manufacturing and distribution, providing 
malign actors with opportunities to compromise and disrupt critical manu-
facturing capabilities. Second, malign actors can compromise the IoT devices 
themselves during their manufacture and distribution, potentially allowing 
for the implant of backdoors that could allow unauthorized access to IoT 
devices deployed on DOD networks. In the latter case, a malign actor need 
not ‘hack’ into an IoT device because the device had been outfitted with an 
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open backdoor during their manufacture. A backdoor allows a malign actor 
access without authenticating to a system, thereby providing the actor with 
remote access to not only to the IoT device, but potentially other systems 
connected to the DOD network.
A reported example of an attack on an IoT device that allowed a malign 
actor to connect to other computers on a network occurred in a North Amer-
ican casino. In this case, a malign actor penetrated an internet-connected 
fish tank in the casino.172 The fish tank contained sensors that were coupled 
to a computer that measured and regulated food, temperature, and water 
cleanliness. Once the malign actor connected to the “IoT fish tank,” the actor 
was able to connect to other computers on the casino’s network that stored 
sensitive data, resulting in the exfiltration of 10 GB of data.173 
The DOD report warned that IoT devices are designed and fielded with 
minimal security requirements and testing, and the ever-increasing com-
plexity and connectivity of networks could lead to widespread vulnerabili-
ties in civilian and U.S. government infrastructures. This concern has been 
underscored by leaders in the intelligence community. In his 2016 World-
wide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Director of 
National Intelligence noted: “In the future, intelligence services might use 
the IoT for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and 
targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.”174 
In 2017, the GAO published a report on a study conducted on the secu-
rity risks of IoT devices, due to their increasing use by the DOD.175 Table 1 
displays the risks of IoT devices.176
According to the GAO report, there are multiple and varied risks involv-
ing IoT devices in how they are designed, manufactured, and configured, 
and unfortunately, there is currently little incentive for some manufacturers 
to invest in the design and implementation of robust security functions into 
their products, although new government regulations may change this.177 
A 2016 DOD report noted that IoT devices will be increasingly used on 
the battlefield, and if not properly secured, could result in profound nega-
tive consequences for missions.178 The report provided an alarming scenario 
involving warfighters on the battlefield:
Imagine that the enemy takes advantage of vulnerabilities in the 
[IoT] devices or networking, hacking into or compromising these 
devices and the information they supply. This may allow the enemy 
Device risk Description of Concern
Supply Chain 
Threat
The manufacturing origin of IoT devices and related components poses a significant 
concern. Adversarial countries like China and Russia could embed “exploits,” or mali-
cious software, into the hardware of chips and other components used in IoT devices, 
such as smart meters, to collect and transmit data. 
Limited Encryption Limited encryption in the hardware of IoT devices or the collection and transmission 
of unencrypted data poses a significant concern. IoT devices have not been designed 
to facilitate deployment of the latest cryptographic algorithms and protocols, thus 
posing a range of potential risks, to include eavesdropping, unauthorized access, and 
device tampering.
Poor Security in 
Device Design
Current IoT devices have limited security in the design of their hardware and soft-
ware, including chip design and cybersecurity software. With little built-in security, 




Poor password management or authentication protocols could lead to DOD industrial 
control systems or personal IoT accounts being compromised or manipulated by 
outside hackers.
Patch or Upgrade 
Deficiencies
As the number of IoT devices increases, the probability of missing—or not imple-
menting—a security upgrade or patch increases, and some devices may not be 
patchable at all. In addition, a device could be kept in service longer than it is sched-
uled to receive security or management updates, which at least one DOD component 
refers to as a “zombie device.” Any of these situations could lead to potentially vulner-
able or exploitable devices by which malign actors could gain unauthorized access.
Operational Risks
Rogue Applications Some device applications—such as gaming applications—could be installed on 
personal or even DOD smartphones or other devices, which then take pictures or 
record the user’s locations. Such functionality of rogue applications could pose 
security implications for DOD personnel or facilities.
Adverse Impacts 
of Devices on 
Operations 
Security
IoT devices, including personal smartphones, can tag a person’s location—known 
as geo-tagging—which presents implications for operations security. Officials from 
three services noted the lack of awareness among their personnel over IoT device 
capabilities in their environment and the need for behavioral changes.
Rogue Wireless 
Devices and Insider 
Threat
An increase in the number of IoT devices could significantly increase DOD’s vulner-
ability to cyber collection. Rogue wireless devices planted by an insider threat or 
intentionally placed by service personnel (and then compromised) could collect 




The expansion of IoT devices will significantly increase the number of points at which 
any network can be attacked. IoT devices would provide more attack vectors into a 
network and a potential platform for massive, distributed attacks.
Unauthorized 
Communication of 
Information to Third 
Parties
Some IoT devices could by design collect and send data back to commercial 
providers, such as third-party help desks, and DOD components may have little 
insight into the internet destinations of such data.
Table 1. Risks of IoT Devices 
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to provide false information to the warfighter and the supporting 
remote organizations, making decisions and actions they take either 
unreliable or dangerous. At the same time, they can also see the 
information that should have gone to the warfighter, giving them the 
advantage of the situational awareness and further allowing them 
to take advantage of the confusion they have created through the 
injection of false information into the warfighter decision making.179
The most devastating IoT attack in the civilian domain occurred in Octo-
ber 2016. Dubbed “Mirai,” the attack involved a malign actor identifying 
vulnerable IoT devices on the internet,180 and then using a list of known 
default credentials to gain access and infect the devices with malware.181 
Once a device was infected, it transmitted the internet protocol address of 
the newly infected device to the malign actor. Over 600,000 IoT devices were 
infected and aggregated into a single interconnected entity called a botnet. 
The malign actor could then send a signal to the botnet to direct massive and 
overwhelming volumes of internet traffic to websites, rendering them essen-
tially inoperable. Targets included a well-known cybersecurity researcher, 
as well as the internet traffic company DYN, which provides services for 
websites like Amazon, Spotify and Twitter.182 This attack effectively shut 
down dozens of large websites for several days. 
Botnets attack a system’s availability, which is the measure of reliable 
uptime for server or networked computer systems. To maintain battlefield 
supremacy, IoBT, servers, and networks need close to 100 percent uptime. It 
is imperative the DOD provides protective and mitigation strategies against 
attacks to damage availability. 
Human Domain Attack Vectors
The average person thinks that cyberattacks require great technical skill and 
that most attacks are of a technical nature; however, this is not the case. Bruce 
Schneier, distinguished cybersecurity expert and chief technology officer of 
Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., once said: “Amateurs hack systems. Pro-
fessionals hack people.” 183 This quote highlights the number of non-technical 
cyberattacks that are conducted daily against everyone who has a device 
connected to the internet. Information systems are composed of not only 
hardware, software, networks, and data, but people as well. As such, malign 
actors exploit weaknesses in the psychology of human users to influence 
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them to do something that allows the actor access to information or systems. 
To do something could mean something as simple as clicking a web link, 
clicking an email attachment, 
filling in a web form, or reply-
ing to an email. The psychologi-
cal manipulation of humans is 
called social engineering, which 
are attempts to trick a user into 
revealing information that can 
be used to attack computing systems or networks.184 The following describes 
the more common social engineering devices. 
Human Domain: Phishing
The most common social engineering attack involves phishing and its vari-
ants. Phishing is an umbrella term for several types of social engineering 
attacks, and although a social engineering attack can occur through any 
medium, including text messages, phone calls, regular mail, and even face-
to-face, the most common attack vector is through email. Phishing attacks 
are one of the most common cyberattack vectors across both government and 
industry.185 Everyone with an email account has received a phishing email. 
The goal of the malign actor is to use social engineering to dupe unsuspect-
ing victims to react to the contents of the email. A phishing attack typically 
involves the actor sending an email under the guise of a seemingly legitimate 
offer, request, or demand. The malign actor uses a number of psychological 
principles to influence a user to react to the message, including greed (“Free 
$50 Amazon gift card!”), fear (a message from the U.S. Internal Revenue Ser-
vice [IRS] regarding unpaid taxes), empathy (asking for help by a person in 
distress), and vanity (a message from an attractive person asking to connect). 
Other psychological forcers are often combined with these methods, such as 
stressing urgency (“Offer expires at midnight!”) and appealing to authority 
(the IRS example), to create a powerful incentive for the user to respond.
A more formidable variation of phishing is spear phishing. Spear phish-
ing involves a message that appears to be from a source the user trusts, such 
as a family member, friend, chief executive officer (CEO), boss, etc. These 
attacks are successful because of the element of trust, and sometimes appeal 
to authority as in the case of a message from a boss or CEO. Spear phishing 
occurs less frequently than mass email phishing attacks because it requires 
As such, malign actors exploit weak-
nesses in the psychology of human 
users to influence them to do some-
thing that allows the actor access to 
information or systems.
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additional research on the part of the malign actor. Additionally, whaling, 
a variant of spear phishing, is a term where the target is a high-ranking 
member of the organization, such as a CEO, board member, or government 
or military decision maker/leader, etc. 
A widely published example of a spear phishing attack involved John 
Podesta, who at the time was Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair during her 
2016 Presidential run.186 Podesta received a spear phishing email pretend-
ing to be from Google which indicated that someone from the Ukraine had 
used his password to login to his Gmail account, and was urged to change 
his password immediately.187 The email included an appeal to authority/
trust (Google), fear (someone from the Ukraine had his password), and 
urgency (the message “You should change your password immediately.”). 
After contacting his IT person about the email’s legitimacy, Podesta clicked 
on a “Change Password” button, leading him to website that looked like the 
Gmail login page, but was in reality a bogus website set up for the purpose 
of stealing his username and password.188 Once the malign actor harvested 
Podesta’s credentials, the actor logged into Podesta’s Gmail account and 
downloaded his emails, which were subsequently published on the internet.189 
Human-Domain: Business Email Compromise (BEC)/Email Account 
Compromise (EAC)
One of the primary social engineering threats to small- and medium-sized 
businesses is through BEC or EAC. In BEC attacks, malign actors rely on 
social engineering techniques to trick unsuspecting employees into autho-
rizing payment of invoices through wire transfer or other means. Email is 
the primary attack vector.190 BEC is often facilitated by impersonating the 
individual responsible for authorizing these wire transfers, such as a CEO or 
other decision maker. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified 
five forms of BEC attacks:191
1. Bogus Invoice Scheme. Malign actors pretend to be suppliers who 
request wire transfer of funds to an account owned by the actors.
2. CEO Fraud. Posing as the company executive, the malign actors send 
an email to finance department employees, requesting wire transfers 
to an account owned by the actors.
3. Account Compromise. A company executives email account is com-
promised (e.g., through social engineering) by malign actors, who 
34
JSOU Report 21 -3
then send emails requesting payment of invoices to suppliers listed 
in the companies email contacts.
4. Attorney Impersonation. Malign actors pretend to be lawyers from 
a firm responsible for sensitive company business. 
5. Data Theft. Human resources employees are targeted and compro-
mised, typically through social engineering, to obtain personal identi-
fying information regarding key company employees and executives, 
which can later be used in further targeted attacks.
According to the latest FBI’s Internet Crime Report, there were 23,775 
reports of BEC/EAC attacks in 2019, accounting for $1.7 billion in losses.192 
Even experienced business owners and their employees are subject to these 
types of attacks. “Shark Tank” judge Barbara Corcoran lost $388,700 in early 
2020 through a BEC attack. A malign actor pretending to be Ms. Corcoran’s 
assistant emailed an invoice for a renovation to Ms. Corcoran’s bookkeep-
er.193 The bookkeeper wired the funds to an account specified in the email. 
However, the email address did not belong to her assistant, as the malign 
actor had imitated her assistant’s email address by misspelling it by a single 
letter.194 The mistake was not identified until the bookkeeper emailed the 
assistant’s correct address for a follow-up. The business owner acknowledged 
that she would not be able to recover the lost funds.
While the DOD and governmental agencies have multiple checks and 
balances in acquisition, small suppliers that provide parts and services in 
the supply chain are less likely to be able to implement stringent safeguards. 
What if a small- or medium-sized business was attacked, resulting in the loss 
of the supplier’s ability to provide the necessary components to other supply 
chain participants? Small suppliers arguably are less likely to withstand con-
certed and persistence cyberattacks, as they may not have the resources or 
expertise to put into place stringent safeguards.195 The impetus for a cyberat-
tack may not even be related to the supply chain directly, it may have other 
motivations—such as theft—which could result in a supplier not being able 
to deliver. What happens if a critical component cannot be sourced from an 
alternate supplier? What redundancies would allow a replacement such that 
the supply chain could continue to function? The FBI warned that a supply 
chain vendor’s current financial state, as well as their capability to meet 
requirements with current and increased demand, should be considered an 
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essential part of the supply chain review process.196 Additionally, a supplier’s 
financial background should be critically reviewed, and consideration should 
be given to the impact should the provider no longer be capable of fulfilling 
requirements.197 
Human Domain: Insider Threats
Insiders are one of the biggest, if not the biggest, threat to cyber systems.198 
An insider is someone authorized to use a system and often has physical 
access to the system. Examples of insiders include full- or part-time employ-
ees, and contractors. A nearsider is someone who only has physical access 
but not granted logical access (i.e., username and password) to a system. For 
example, a civilian touring a U.S. military installation would be considered 
a nearsider. The DOD has recognized the potential threats from insiders:199
Some cyber threats also may come from insiders. Malicious insid-
ers may exploit their access at the behest of foreign governments, 
terrorist groups, criminal elements, unscrupulous associates, or on 
their own initiative. Whether malicious insiders are committing 
espionage, making a political statement, or expressing personal 
disgruntlement, the consequences for DoD, and national security, 
can be devastating.200
There are several reasons that insiders are insidious threats. Insiders 
are normally vetted by their employers through background checks, and 
after vetting, are provided logical access to systems and sometimes physical 
access.201 Access provides the insider with increased opportunities for attack-
ing a system. Insiders may also be able to socially engineer an escalation of 
privileges to higher classified information and systems.202 Insider threats 
need not be intentional; threats can also be unintentional or accidental as 
noted by the GAO: “Insider threats include DOD personnel working directly 
with adversaries to collect information or DOD personnel unintentionally 
assisting adversaries through their inattention to cybersecurity (e.g., poor 
cyber hygiene) or other actions.” 203
An alleged insider attack affecting the supply chain for personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE) during the COVID-19 pandemic occurred after a medi-
cal device packaging company terminated an employee.204, 205 The employee 
had administrator access to computer systems containing shipping informa-
tion, and had added an alternate administrator-level account on the systems 
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prior to his termination.206 After the termination, the suspect was alleged to 
have used the alternate account to remotely connect to the computers that 
stored shipping information, where he edited roughly 116,000 records and 
deleted roughly 2,400 records.207 These alterations disrupted the company’s 
shipping processes, causing delays in the delivery of the equipment to hos-
pitals and other healthcare providers.208
Well-known examples of vetted insiders with top security clearances who 
exfiltrated classified information from U.S. intelligence or law enforcement 
agencies, or the U.S. military include Edward Snowden209 (NSA), Joshua 
A. Schulte210 (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), Robert Hanssen211 (FBI), 
Aldrich Ames212 (CIA), and Chelsea Manning213 (U.S. Army). Of the five, 
Snowden, Schulte, and Manning used cyber methods to exfiltrate substantial 
quantities of classified information.214
Takeaways for the SOF Community
As described above, there are multiple methods of cyber compromise in 
the supply chain, ranging from technically sophisticated attacks requir-
ing great skill and resources, to mundane social engineering attacks easily 
accomplished through an email. What this suggests is that the SOF com-
munity must take a multipronged approach to mitigate supply chain threats. 
Increased vigilance regarding the provenance of hardware and software, as 
well as rigorous testing of hardware and software, will be key determinants, 
among other things, in mitigating any threats posed. Additionally, training, 
education, and awareness programs regarding social engineering attacks is 
a crucial factor in reducing the likelihood of these types of attacks occur-
ring. Training, education, and awareness programs should be an ongoing 
concern, provided annually, and not one-offs. Additionally, alternate sources 
for products should be identified to ensure that the supply chain remains 
unbroken should an attack effect a supplier of a crucial component. 
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Chapter 4. Government Regulations for 
C-SCRM
Federal agencies have increasingly been tasked with developing and implementing regulations and guidelines to manage supply chain cyber 
risks.215 The DOD, in particular, has supported the creation of new poli-
cies and management tools to address both the domestic and international 
risks that exist within the supply chain across a program’s life cycle. These 
efforts are intended to provide the government with an increased ability to 
examine supplier C-SCRM practices so that greater supplier compliance 
can be achieved.216 Managing supply chain risks is vital to ensure that the 
products and services acquired can be delivered uncompromised to support 
mission success.
For over 20 years, the U.S. government and other oversight bodies 
have developed and issued regulations and guidelines for cybersecurity.217 
However, just as there has been a growing and evolving understanding of 
C-SCRM within academia, there has been an evolution within the govern-
ment—including the DOD—about how to best mitigate these risks within 
the supply chain. While the following discussion is not an exhaustive list 
of applicable policies and regulations, it demonstrates the emerging under-
standing of the risks the DOD faces within the supply chains.
Prior to the 9-11 attacks, systemic analysis of shipments was not possible, 
and supply chain risk management fell to risk management and insurance 
providers.218 After 9-11, there was a new focus on physical security and more 
structured methodological approaches, and supply chain risk management 
shifted to include cyber in 2012.219 That year, a shift in orientation occurred 
when President Obama signed the U.S. National Strategy for Global Supply 
Chain Security, which identified the need for greater focus on cyber in 
supply chains.220 Additional federal direction was provided in NIST IR 7622: 
Notional Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information 
Systems and NIST SP 800-161: Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations.221 NIST IR 7622 included 
supply chain visibility and assurance methods, while NIST 800-161 incor-
porated the elements of NIST IR 7622, but provided greater measures for 
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ICT by using strategies such as risk identification, risk assessment, and risk 
mitigation.222 
In February 2013, the government published Executive Order 13636, 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which tasked NIST and 
stakeholders with developing a framework using existing practices, guide-
lines, and standards, to reduce critical infrastructure risks.223 The approach 
in developing the framework emphasized repeatable, flexible, prioritized, 
and cost-effective approaches to help manage cyber risk.224 
On 14 March 2014 the DOD released DOD Instruction (DODI) 8500.01, 
Cybersecurity—a foundational document that provides an updated posture 
on cybersecurity.225 This update implemented a common cybersecurity ter-
minology within the federal system, incorporating NIST’s SP 800-53 Security 
Control Catalog which focuses on the implementation of early and continual 
security measures in the acquisition process, and advocates for interoper-
ability, integration, and operational resilience.226
Cyber risk management under the DOD is covered by the January 2017 
Risk, Issues and Opportunities Management Guide for Defense Acquisition 
Programs,227 and the RMF is a corresponding but discrete process.228 In 2014, 
the DOD adopted the RMF for DOD IT when it released DODI 8510.01.229 
RMF for DOD IT identified that all of DOD’s IT falls within the domain of 
the RMF, and incorporates NIST’s RMF framework to align with the recom-
mended processes used by both the intelligence and civilian communities.230 
In addition to covering IT services and IT products, the RMF for DOD IT 
also includes platform IT, information systems, IT R&D, and testing and 
evaluation for both DOD products as well as contractor products and activi-
ties.231 Key changes from the prior DOD Information Assurance Certification 
and Accreditation Process included replacing information assurance with 
cybersecurity, replacing the Certification and Accreditation process with 
the RMF life cycle, updating the security objective to confidentiality, integ-
rity, and availability, and replacing DOD specific terminology with NIST SP 
800-53 Security Control Catalog, the Committee on National Security Systems 
Instruction (CNSSI) 4009, Glossary for Cybersecurity Terms, and CNSSI 1253 
for categorization purposes.232 
In 2017, the DOD issued the DFARS Clause 252.204-7012, Safeguarding 
Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Report for all contracts and 
requiring compliance by December 31, 2017, unless an acquisition was solely 
COTS.233 There are four key elements that contractors must adhere to and 
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flow down to their subcontractors if a subcontractor’s performance requires 
the use of covered defense information, or the subcontractor provides opera-
tionally critical support.234 These elements include safeguarding covered 
defense information, reporting cyber incidents, and submitting malicious 
software and facilitate damage assessment.235 As part of safeguarding criti-
cal information, this regulation also requires contractors and applicable 
subcontractors to implement NIST SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclas-
sified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations.236 
Emergent Regulations: Cybersecurity Maturity Model  
Certification (CMMC) 
Performance, cost, and schedule alone are insufficient for evaluating suppli-
ers; supplier cybersecurity posture should be included as an equally essential 
element of the evaluation process. This sentiment was expressed by the joint 
testimony of the DOD before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) 
where C-SCRM in the DOD’s supply chain was addressed:237 
to elevate the private sector’s focus on security, the Department 
has established a “Deliver Uncompromised” initiative focused on 
industry delivery of capabilities, services, technologies, and weap-
ons systems that are uncompromised by our malign actors from 
cradle-to-grave. It aims to establish security as a fourth pillar in 
acquisition, on par with cost, schedule, and performance, and to 
create incentives for industry to embrace security, not as a “cost 
center,” but as a key differentiator.238
Additionally, the testimony outlined a shift from a compliance-based 
checklist to a holistic and risk-based approach that is fluid based on current 
threats and DOD priorities. This pivot also involved creating a plan to protect 
controlled unclassified information (CUI) that is made available to private 
industry suppliers. The testimony additionally identified that the integrity 
of the supply chain needs to be strengthened and that DOD is actively in the 
process of implementing requirements. 
One of these emerging requirements is the DODI 5000.02, Operation of 
the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, dated 23 January 2020, which empha-
sizes the importance of cybersecurity throughout the acquisition process.239 
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DODI 5000.02 tasks program managers with the responsibility of recogniz-
ing that a critical part of program planning is cybersecurity. Per the DODI 
5000.02:
[cybersecurity] must be addressed early and continuously during the 
program life cycle to ensure cybersecurity operational and technical 
risks are identified and reduced and that fielded systems are capable, 
effective, and resilient.240
DODI 5000.02 also provides the transition plan from existing policies to 
reissued or new policy documents including cybersecurity instructions. The 
DOD plans to issue a new policy DODI 5000.CS, Cybersecurity for Acquisition 
Decision Authorities and Program Managers, that highlights how cyberse-
curity should be considered in an acquisition. 
There were still gaps in the protection of controlled defense information 
even after the implementation of both the Framework and DFARS 252.204-
7012. The Framework was designed to be voluntary and as such had no 
enforcement capabilities if companies failed to comply. DFARS 252.204-
7012 also presented some challenges, notably, it lacked uniform security, and 
cybersecurity practices implemented by the defense industrial base (DIB) 
were inconsistent.241 Additionally, contractors can demonstrate compliance 
simply through self-certifications.242 
Given these concerns, recommendations emerged for the DOD to use 
third-party assessors to ensure compliance with cybersecurity regulations, 
rather than self-certifications.243 The result of this is a new cybersecurity 
assessment model, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC), 
published in early 2020, which provides the DOD the capability of certify-
ing companies at different levels of certifications based upon the supplier’s 
cybersecurity posture maturity.244 The CMMC essentially combines disparate 
cybersecurity requirements into a single unified standard that can then be 
applied to the entirety of the DIB supply chain and assessed through third-
party assessors.245 
The CMMC was designed to strengthen the protection of CUI and federal 
contract information (FCI) within the DIB supply chain.246 Instead of being 
a fourth pillar in the acquisition process, along with cost, schedule, and per-
formance, cybersecurity is now considered a foundational requirement.247 
The CMMC effectively shifts from voluntary self-reporting to standards that 
are measurable and mandatory.248 The DOD now uses the CMMC levels as 
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a requirement for contract awards by incorporating the CMMC into the 
DFARS, issuing an interim rule change to amend DFARS 252.204.7012 in 
September 2020.249 The CMMC will apply to both prime and subcontractors, 
with prime contractors flowing the relevant requirements down to subcon-
tractors. However, a subcontractor may not be required to have a higher-level 
certification if they are not working with CUI.250 Requirements are being 
phased in so that DIB contractors can adjust over the next five years with full 
implementation in new DOD contracts occurring by 2026.251 Current con-
tracts will not be impacted. CMMC Level requirements will be included in 
request for information (RFI) and request for proposals (RFP) and as a con-
dition of award, the appropriate level must be achieved. Under the CMMC, 
contractors will no longer be able to self-attest as they did under DFARS 
252.204-7012; instead, a new independent non-profit CMMC accreditation 
body will oversee assessment organizations that will employ field licensed 
assessors.252 These assessors will then evaluate companies wishing to bid on 
DOD contracts. Companies must submit to CMMC evaluation every three 
years. If a company produces only COTS products, CMMC certification 
will not be required. Figure 3 graphically depicts the five CMMC levels.253 
The CMMC incorporates several existing frameworks and standards. For 
example, levels 1-3 correspond to NISTS 800-171 Rev 1 with additional pro-
cesses and practices incorporated from other frameworks and standards. The 
model incorporates five levels of cybersecurity maturity of a company and, 
Figure 3. CMMC. Derivative from CMMC Version 1.02, created by authors.
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depending on the information to be protected and related threats, provides 
recommended practices and processes. Practices and processes are organized 
into domain sets and align to the five levels. Additionally, practices are asso-
ciated with sets of capabilities within each domain. A company certified to 
level 1 has processes that are performed and basic cyber hygiene sufficient 
for the safeguard of FCI, as demonstrated in figure 3. Companies at level 2 
have documented processes, they possess intermediate cyber hygiene, and 
is a maturity transition level progression towards protection of CUI. Level 
2 is where the DOD expects mostly small businesses to establish processes 
and plan for the future. Companies at level 3 have managed processes with 
good cyber hygiene suitable for the protection of CUI. At level 4, a company’s 
processes are reviewed and have proactive practices. At level 5, a company’s 
processes are said to be optimizing and their practices are advanced/progres-
sive. For both level 4 and 5, the focus is not just to protect CUI but to reduce 
the risk of advanced persistent threats.254 It is anticipated that the model will 
change and evolve as threats change over time. 
CMMC covers 17 domains drawn from the Federal Information Process-
ing Standards Publication 200 security-related areas and also from associ-
ated security requirements in NIST 800-171, as well as other regulations.255 
The domains include access control, asset management, audit and account-
ability, awareness and training, configuration management, identification 
and authentication, incident response, maintenance, media protection, per-
sonnel security, physical protection, recovery, risk management, security 
assessment, situational awareness, systems and communications protec-
tions, and system and information integrity.256 Each domain has associated 
capabilities, e.g., for access control, capabilities include establishing system 
access requirements, control of internal system access, control remote system 
access, and limit data access to authorized users and processes. In total there 
are 43 capabilities associated with the 17 domains.257 
Although the CMMC moves acquisition toward more stringent require-
ments, some have argued that it is not without potential problems. The 
accreditation body website258 indicates that there are over 350,000 companies 
that will have to be assessed, and 10,000 trained assessors will be needed. 
The companies themselves must bear the cost of assessment, which may 
be problematic for small- and medium-size non-defense companies who 
are operating at low margins.259 Also, there is no clear oversight to deter-
mine whether assessments are administered fairly, particularly when it is 
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the company that is paying the assessors.260 Finally, there is a possibility of 
legal disputes when a company is denied a certification; the potential arises 
for them to bid on a contract which they have worked on for months or even 
years.261 It is not clear what happens if a company loses certification in the 
middle of performance. Does this result in contract termination? Who bears 
the burden of costs for litigation? 
The DOD’s position is that the CMMC helps small businesses and that 
the current self-certification makes competition uneven for small busi-
nesses. Under CMMC, the certification level provides a noticeably clear 
go/no-go decision point; CMMC level 1 has 
basic cyber hygiene practices which should be 
low-cost to implement. Another idea to assist 
small businesses is for primes to allow smaller 
subcontractors to operate in the prime’s secure 
environment, rather than establishing their own 
cybersecurity infrastructure.
Takeaways for the SOF Community
Government acquisition regulations and guidelines are in a fluid state. 
Although DFARS Clause 252.204-7012 and NIST’s Framework provide 
mechanisms for mitigating threats, clearly, they are insufficient, given 
the changing natures of supply chains and modernization of warfighting 
technologies. The CMMC, once fully implemented, is expected to provide 
additional mechanisms for securing the supply chain through third-party 
vetting of suppliers. However, the CMMC is not a panacea. It is a large-scale 
change which is likely to have to have tertiary effects on procurers as well as 
suppliers, as described above. So, while the CMMC may indeed strengthen 
elements of the supply chain, it may have unintended negative effects on 
parts of the supply chain that once relied upon—in particular—small- and 
medium-sized businesses. 
The DOD’s position 
is that the CMMC 
helps small businesses 
and that the current 
self-certification makes 
competition uneven 
for small businesses. 
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Chapter 5. The Hyper-Enabled Operator 
(HEO) and the Supply Chain
Presented now is a scenario of a hypothetical future HEO who is inte-grated into an ICT battlefield system that includes personal wearables, 
weapon systems, vehicles, and other equipment—all of which are equipped 
with IoBT smart, portable, network-connected sensors allowing for the near 
real-time collection and processing of data. The warfighter’s IoBT includes 
wearable biometric devices that collect data on the physical and mental 
state of the warfighter, as well as environmental conditions. These sensors 
continuously collect context data about the warfighter, equipment, and the 
environment; the data is aggregated, synthesized, and transmitted upstream 
to command for feedback and decision-making purposes as demonstrated 
in figure 4.262 For simplicity we assume that the IoBT are custom designed 
and manufactured devices but that also contain some COTS hardware com-
ponents and software. 
Figure 4. Integrated HEO System. Derivative from IEEE Cloud Computing article, 
created by authors.
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As noted earlier, there has been a shift within the DOD to gravitate 
toward COTS products where feasible and practical. The DOD’s acquisi-
tion life cycle differs in terminology than that of their suppliers. While 
the names of the life cycle stages may be different between companies, the 
stages themselves are similar, are applicable to program-specific products 
or COTS, and are for both prime and subcontracts. For the scenario, the 
authors use a unified model of life cycle terminology developed by research-
ers and graphically depicted earlier in figure 2. The researchers identified the 
most common terminology used for COTS hardware and software product 
life cycles through a literature review from government agencies acquisi-
tion procedures, industry standards, and academic literature.263 They used 
the recurrent terminology to create a single unifying model with common 
terminology. Differences in terminology emerged between hardware and 
software, so slightly different product life cycle terminology exists between 
the two. Seven distinct product life cycle stages were identified: 
1. requirements 
2. design 
3. manufacturing for hardware and development for software 
4. testing 
5. distribution
6. use and maintenance 
7. disposal for both hardware and software264 
The unified terminology, definitions, and relationship of the life cycle 
stages are presented in figure 5.265 
Attack Vectors Across the Product Life Cycle
In this section, for each life cycle stage we identify potential vulnerabilities 
and cyberattacks, historical examples of vulnerabilities and cyberattacks, 
and hypothetical attacks against the future warfighter on the battlefield. 
For hypothetical attacks on the warfighter, we describe unique attacks at 
each stage so as to not duplicate attacks across multiple stages; in real-world 
attacks, however, the same attack could be relevant across multiple stages. 
47
Craiger, Craiger, and Zorri: Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineer-
ing commissioned research to investigate potential attacks on the supply 
chain across each of the product life cycle stages.266 This research culminated 
in an extensive catalog of attacks for each of the life cycle stages, with the 
number of potential attacks in a life cycle stage indicating the relative vulner-
ability or risk of that stage to cyber compromise. The relative frequency of 
catalogued attacks were then used by others to quantify the relative risk of 
each life cycle stage to attack using theoretical weights. Figure 6267 displays 
theoretical risk weightings—i.e., potentials for attacks—across each stage 
of the life cycle.268 
Figure 6 illustrates the comparative theoretical risks to hardware and 
software across the product life cycle. Adding all weights across the stages 
adds to 1.0, providing a relative comparison between life cycle stages, and 
comparisons between software and hardware within a life cycle stage. The 
lowest weights are .05 for the requirements stage for both hardware and 
software. The highest weight for software, .25, is the distribution stage; for 
hardware, .30 is the manufacturing stage. These data points, while theoreti-
cal, are representative of the historical cyberattacks described earlier. During 
the manufacture of hardware—e.g., motherboards, electronic components, 
etc.—malign actors can substitute counterfeit components, add additional 
Figure 5. Product Lifecycle Model. Derivative from Sandia Report by authors.
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electronic components that provide remote access, or install malicious firm-
ware.269 Likewise, the software distribution stage can result in highest level 
of threat during initial software distribution or during the software update 
stage through the addition of malicious code. The following are descriptions 
of each of the aforementioned seven life cycle stages along with their cyber 
threats and risks; where applicable, actual examples of cyberattacks; and 
finally, hypothetical cyber threats to the integrated warfighter.
1. Requirements. The requirements stage is where the abstract capabilities 
of the product are identified, based on the needs of the mission. This 
stage may evolve from a “concept” stage which is a more amorphous 
description of functionality required for a mission. For program-
specific solutions, this is the phase where the government’s acquiring 
agency or department would define requirements based on identified 
needs. Specific requirements would be identified, and RFPs issued. 
Risks. Risks are considered low in this stage, as requirements may 
undergo numerous iterative reviews which would likely reveal mali-
cious intent.270 Data rights assertions can identify the extent to which 
a program-specific product uses open source software as one way of 
Figure 6. Cyber Supply Chain Risk Weighting (Software vs. Hardware). 
Graphic created from data in Sandia Report by authors.
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assessing risk in the requirements stage. A potential issue may arise 
once requirements are identified, a supplier for a COTS product has 
been selected, and systems have been purchased and fielded: the sup-
plier may be acquired by a non-U.S. competitor—or worse, a potential 
adversary—which may cause mission disruptions. For instance, in 
2014 Lenovo Group, a Chinese computer manufacturing company, 
purchased IBM’s low-end server business for $2.3 billion. These servers 
were installed, and an integral part of, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis Combat 
System.271 The primary concern for the Navy was that the servers 
could be potentially compromised during routine maintenance, such 
as hardware and/or software upgrades, which would be provided by 
Lenovo.272 Additionally, there was a concern that information on the 
weapons system could be accessed remotely by Chinese government 
agents through a backdoor.273 Due to these concerns, the Program 
Executive Office (PEO) for Integrated Warfare Systems’ Aegis program 
office—and the manufacturer of the Aegis Combat System, Lockheed 
Martin—were required to evaluate alternate hardware solutions to 
mitigate the impact of the sale.274 In 2016, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff 
warned the DOD and their personnel against purchasing any comput-
ers manufactured by Lenovo.275 An internal report by the J-2 intel-
ligence directorate stated that cybersecurity officials were concerned 
that these devices could introduce compromised hardware into the 
DOD’s supply chain—helping China by facilitating cyber intelligence 
gathering against both classified and unclassified DOD networks.276 
While the requirements stage is one of the stages least likely to fall 
under compromise, it is not immune. For instance, during require-
ments development the descriptions of an IoBT’s capabilities may 
be altered or misrepresented—potentially causing inaccuracies in 
derived system requirements.277 Thus, the IoBT may not fully encom-
pass all the functionality as initially conceptualized by the procurer, 
or functionality may not appear as originally conceptualized. Also, a 
malign actor may distort software requirements, resulting in errors 
in the design stage—which again affect the IoBT to fully encompass 
all functionality as originally conceptualized and required by mission 
needs.278 It would be reasonable to conclude that insiders would have 
the best chance of carrying out these types of attacks.
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2. Design. The design stage is where activities are engaged to meet the 
specified requirements, and abstract capabilities from the requirements 
stage are combined with additional details of the product’s components 
and functionality by designers and engineers.279 Vulnerabilities may 
result from intentional acts from malign actors, or non-malicious 
bad decisions by suppliers. Secure software design is a fundamental 
part of critical systems where a primary objective is to produce a 
system that has the necessary authentication, authorization, confi-
dentiality, data integrity, and availability as specified by the product 
requirements.280 Authentication is defined as a user providing proof 
of identify to a system, through username and password, personal 
identification number, or biometric, etc.; authorization is defined as 
the process that ensures that a user has access only to those files and 
system functions required to perform their job, and no more.281 Insuf-
ficient detail to these requirements can result in some of the issues 
described previously, such as when DOD system testers identified 
multiple vulnerabilities in DOD weapons systems, and were able to 
successfully penetrate the systems.282
Risks. Risks in the design stage may just as likely to be caused by 
unintentional non-malicious acts as intentional acts. Unintentional 
non-malicious acts may be due to lack of due diligence to speed up 
production and meet product schedules. From a software perspective, 
examples include the selection of an inappropriate algorithm; failure 
to implement error handling in code; or failure to include mechanisms 
for encryption or digital signing, which can cause the information 
leakage.283 On the hardware side, components selected may become 
obsolete by the time a system is fielded, and OEM components may 
no longer be available, forcing the DOD to purchase from suppliers 
where “pedigree is less secure, and provenance is more difficult to track 
using current procedures.”284 This is a real concern—as approximately 
70 percent of electronics in fielded weapons systems are obsolete or 
no longer in production prior to fielding the systems.285 
As mentioned above, the design stage can be affected by compro-
mises in the software requirements stage. For instance, a malign actor 
with access to requirements specifications and/or software design 
processes and tools can alter them to cause errors in system design.286 
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The result is that the IoBT may not encompass the full functionality 
as originally conceptualized. Software developers could also fail to 
implement error handling in the source code, causing IoBT devices 
to malfunction and provide inaccurate data, or become inoperable. 
Inaccurate data may be a bigger problem as data are aggregated, syn-
thesized, and directed upstream to command to provide decision 
makers with an inaccurate picture of the battlefield.
3. Hardware Manufacturing and Software Development. Software 
development is the process of producing source code which is then 
compiled into executable code that supports the intended function-
ality identified in the requirements and design stages.287 Hardware 
manufacturing involves the concrete production of the specified design 
through assembled components. In this stage, multiple tiers of the 
supply chain provide hardware components or subsystems that are 
then fabricated and assembled into the final product.288
Risks. Manufacture of hardware is normally the most complex stage 
of the hardware life cycle as it involves the most participants and 
activities.289 Consequently, there are more potential attack vectors 
at this stage. Hardware implants—such as extra electronic micro-
chips included on the motherboard that were not part of the original 
design—can be added, as the Supermicro story described earlier. But 
this is not a unique case. In 2010, computer manufacturing company 
Dell acknowledged that some of its PowerEdge servers shipped with 
malware installed on the motherboard’s embedded server manage-
ment firmware.290 Unfortunately, there is little detail published on the 
type of malware or its intended function, but the fact that the malware 
was found on the server management board (SMB) suggests that the 
malware might have functioned as a backdoor given the purpose of 
the SMB is to provide remote access to an authorized administrator. 
Given that the servers shipped with the malware installed, one might 
surmise that an insider infected the motherboards, or a third-party 
supplier was the source. Regardless, this was clearly a supply chain 
attack. 
It is a truism that as system complexity increases, there is an atten-
dant requirement for more lines of source code. Complex systems 
can contain millions of lines of source code.291 Estimates vary on the 
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number of security issues, i.e., “bugs,” identified per line of source code, 
but they range from one bug per 1,000 lines of well-written code up 
to 25 per 1,000 lines for less well-written code.292 Using the conserva-
tive estimate of one bug per 1,000 of lines of source code, one could 
extrapolate that a large system with 20,000,000 lines of well-written 
code could potentially contain 20,000 bugs. Each bug is a potential 
vulnerability which could affect warfighters’ capabilities and mission 
success. Although most security vulnerabilities in code are not placed 
maliciously, the potential effects are the same. 
In the introduction, there was a description of an early instance of 
IoBT that involved U.S. Army helmets containing built-in sensors that 
transmitted sensed data over networks to physicians, who could then 
assist in diagnosing brain injuries.293 Future IoBT devices are likely 
to include biometric sensors to measure the warfighter’s physical and 
mental state, as well as environmental sensors, all of which provide 
data that are aggregated and synthesized to provide the warfighter and 
command with an accurate picture of the battlefield.294 Failure to use 
encryption, or the use of weak encryption, could allow a malign actor to 
intercept the data, providing the actor with insight on the warfighter’s 
health, the warfighter’s systems in use, troop locations and movements, 
etc. More problematic, the sensed data could be intercepted, modified, 
and then transmitted upstream to the command level, providing a 
false picture of the battlefield. On the hardware side, a malign actor 
could substitute a modified microelectronics component containing 
malicious logic, causing false data to be transmitted upstream, provid-
ing an unrealistic picture of battlefield and warfighter conditions. The 
malign actor could also substitute counterfeit components that are less 
reliable than OEM components, causing the units to fail more quickly. 
4. Testing. Testing is the systematic assessment of the hardware and soft-
ware separately, or the system as defined by the integrated hardware 
and software package. Testing can be a complex activity depending 
upon the level of testing required. Minimally, a system needs to be 
tested to ensure that it performs the functions specified in the require-
ments stage and within designated performance minimums. 
Risks. Testing is straightforward: run a series of tests to determine 
if the system correctly performs the functions as specified in the 
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requirements and design stages. As mentioned earlier, what is not 
apparent is the answer to the question “what else can the system do?” 
Malign actors can add malicious functionality to the source code, 
which may be triggered by an event or condition. Alternatively, open 
source code—e.g., common software libraries—may contain latent 
vulnerabilities or malicious functionality.295, 296 Unless the source code 
is available for review, it is difficult to identify all functionality if only 
the compiled executable code is available. 
Latent vulnerabilities often elude testing because most testing 
involves ensuring that the system functions as specified, but may fail 
to invoke circumstances which might render the system inoperable. 
For instance, previously discussed was the story of a weapons system 
that shutdown when DOD security testers performed a simple network 
scan of the system.297 A network scan is one of the first activities that 
malign actors perform when seeking to gain access and control a net-
worked system. A network scan provides the actor with information 
on what computers are connected and running on the network, as well 
as what types of network traffic each computer is responding to (e.g., 
web network traffic, email network traffic, etc.). Accordingly, testing 
should include functionality testing as well as other forms of testing 
for activities that a potential malign actor may perform. 
Systems often rely on input from humans—such as typing in a 
text box, typing a keyboard combination, or reading data from other 
systems. Software accepting data input from any source needs to be 
tested for out-of-bounds conditions, such as data that is too little, too 
much, or not in an acceptable format. If a system receives data in a 
format not expected, it can cause the software to fail, or to behave in 
an unexpected manner.298 Securely designed software is expected to 
identify these conditions and handle them appropriately; if it doesn’t, 
the system may not function as expected or become inoperable.
On the hardware side, counterfeit hardware parts may be identified 
during quality assurance testing.299 Testing for malicious hardware 
modification may require disassembling the system into its component 
pieces, which is problematic on large scales.300 As discussed in the 
introduction, the DOD noted that 15 percent of its parts were identi-
fied as counterfeit in the last decade.301
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Here is the scenario: an HEO has a weapon system outfitted with 
an IoBT GPS sensor. The system passed testing in the U.S.; however, 
a malign actor was able to insert malicious functionality—such as a 
logic bomb—into the code during the software development stage, 
or during the software update stage. The logic bomb’s code is set to 
execute whenever the latitude and longitude indicate that the IoBT is 
in enemy territory, causing the weapons system to provide false data, 
or become inoperable. 
5. Distribution. Distribution involves the packaging, warehousing, and 
delivery of a product—system, component, or software—from sup-
plier to end-user customers.302 For the hypothetical HEO scenario, it 
is assumed that all hardware comes assembled and software installed 
where appropriate. Distribution occurs through vetted freight forward-
ers and normal DOD distribution channels. 
Risks. Potential risks occur during product initial shipping, as well as 
shipping of replacement parts. Freight forwarders are normally vetted 
by the government and are on an “approved” list; however, each addi-
tional layer in the shipping and storage process opens opportunities 
for malign actors to intercept and modify the systems. As with testing, 
shipping may also occur within other stages of the life cycle whenever 
the final product or its components are in transit. For instance, ship-
ping is also required during the maintenance and disposal stages, with 
multiple participants supporting the transportation of the soon-to-be 
retired system.303 
Counterfeit parts or entire systems are another issue in the dis-
tribution stage. In 2008, Cisco—the largest manufacturer of network 
routers304—admitted that its partners sold counterfeit Cisco products 
to the U.S. military.305 In a leaked FBI PowerPoint presentation that 
detailed “Operation Cisco Router,” the FBI identified the counterfeit 
products came from Shenzhen, province of China, but were unable to 
determine if the goods were made by state-sponsored malign actors, 
or for entities that were for-profit. The FBI noted that the counterfeits 
could open hardware backdoors, allowing an attacker to gain access 
and control the router.306 Additionally, counterfeit products are known 
to have higher failure rates than OEM equipment, with the FBI noting 
that one of these counterfeit products caught fire in a government 
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network due a faulty power supply.307 Additionally, one company was 
cited for allegedly selling counterfeit products from China to the U.S. 
Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), universities, financial institutions, defense contractors, and 
the FBI.308
The FBI identified the supply chain issue, finding that Cisco did 
little or no vetting of “Cisco partners”—noting that “silver” and “gold” 
level partners were selling the products to the government. The FBI 
also noted that these problems stem from long standing U.S. govern-
ment practices of buying from the lowest bidder. At the time, a genuine 
Cisco router cost $1,375, whereas "gray” market routers cost about a 
sixth of that price—approximately $234.309 This example underscores 
the issue previously described, where procurers may have no insight 
as to who the participants are in the supply chain outside of the near-
est participants. 
Shipped items are commonly tracked through radio frequency 
identification (RFID) tags. RFID are electronic tags that are attached 
to or embedded in objects for identification and tracking purposes.310 
Components embedded with RFID tags can be tracked using RFID 
readers that are placed along the distribution path. When an RFID 
tag is read by an RFID reader, information on product identification 
and location is transmitted over networks back to the organization for 
tracking purposes. The security of this information—confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability—is only as good as the security of the net-
works over which data are traveling. Imagine several thousand IoBT 
devices shipped to a battle zone. If a malign actor intercepted RFID 
data traveling over a network, it might allow the actor to determine 
the product being shipped, their destination, the number of products 
in the shipment—and therefore, estimates of number of troops and 
their locations, etc. This would provide the malign actor with insight 
on sensitive battlefield operational plans and capabilities. 
6. Use and Maintenance. During this stage, the end user will make use 
of the system for its intended functionality, and maintain it to ensure it 
continues to function. Hardware systems often require maintenance, 
including regular physical maintenance (e.g., cleaning), and replacing 
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malfunctioning or worn components. Software updates are common 
to patch security issues or add additional functionality to a system. 
Risks. System misconfiguration—or, lack of configuration—may lead 
to unseen vulnerabilities. For instance, systems are normally shipped 
with a set of default credentials that allow the initial administrative 
user to setup the system for deployment in the field. Changing the 
default credentials should be an immediate task for the administra-
tor, as leaving default credentials can lead to a malign actor’s ability 
to access the system; as discussed previously, DOD testers were able 
to gain access to weapons systems because default credentials were 
not changed.311 
Software Update Attacks. During this stage, users will maintain their 
systems through security updates, updating the device’s operating 
system, and installing additional software that also requires updates 
to patch security issues on a regular basis. Most large software manu-
facturers use digital certificates312 to digitally sign software, ensuring 
software is verified to be from the authentic source and that it has not 
been modified from its original state. The digital signature process can 
be thought of as a digital means of “notarizing” software, much like 
a notary public authenticates signatures on legal documents. When 
a user installs or updates software, this digital signature is checked 
for authenticity. Normally, if a malign actor replaces or changes the 
original file, either a warning message will display or the software 
installation/update will fail to proceed, or both. Unfortunately, digital 
certificates are not foolproof as a means of authentication. In 2011, 
a malign actor—allegedly from Iran—was able to gain access to an 
account from a trusted partner of the certificate authority313 Comodo. 
The malign actor issued nine fraudulent digital certificates for several 
domains, including mail.google.com, www.google.com, login.skype.
com, login.live.com, and several others.314 
All major operating system and application manufacturers provide 
regular software updates that remedy security or performance issues. 
Moreover, many manufacturers support automatic updates so that 
they occur without manual user intervention, and can be scheduled 
for off-peak hours so that user activity is not disrupted. Malign actors 
have exploited these two details to create software update supply chain 
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attacks, which increased 78 percent between 2017 and 2018.315 A soft-
ware update supply chain attack is defined as:
Implanting a piece of malware into an otherwise legitimate 
software package at its usual distribution location; this can 
occur during production at the software supplier, at a third-
party storage location, or through redirection.316 
Software update attacks are effective because they exploit a trusted 
channel (the software manufacturer), and automatic updates allow 
the malware infections to grow quickly without manual intervention 
by the malign actor. 
In 2019, a software update supply chain attack occurred that 
involved malware on ASUS laptops. Ostensibly, the malign actors 
leveraged a backdoor attack, modifying the ASUS Live Update Utility 
that delivers software updates to laptops and desktops.317 The software 
utility was digitally signed with a legitimate digital certificate and 
hosted on an official ASUS server dedicated to providing updates to 
ASUS computers.318 It was estimated that one million users downloaded 
the utility. The fact that malign actors were able to leverage legitimate 
digital certificates meant to ensure a file’s origin and integrity is cause 
for alarm. 
Ransomware. Another threat during this stage is ransomware. Ran-
somware, as described earlier in this monograph, is malware that 
encrypts files on a computing device. The encryption is sufficiently 
strong enough so that files cannot be decrypted without a decryption 
key. In a civilian scenario, once the ransomware encrypts the files, a 
message is presented to the user that explains what has occurred with 
instructions on how to purchase a decryption key using some form 
of anonymous cryptocurrency so that there can be no attribution 
back to the identity of the malign actor(s).319 The ransomware pay-
load—the actual malware that infects the host computer and encrypts 
files—often arrives in the form of a legitimate appearing attachment 
to an email (e.g., an invoice). Once the attachment is clicked by the 
user, the ransomware silently starts the encryption process. The user 
is normally unaware of the encryption running until it is too late. 
Phishing emails are the primary attack vector for ransomware in the 
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civilian domain, although there is the potential for ransomware to be 
part of a software update.320 
Most ransomware is written for versions of the Windows operat-
ing system—given that Windows holds 89 percent of total desktop/
laptop operating system market share—and therefore remains a bigger 
target.321 Although strains of ransomware exist for Apple MacOS and 
Linux operating systems, as of mid-2020 they are relatively rare; moti-
vated, state-funded malign actors can with no doubt create a strain of 
ransomware that could target a weapon or support systems running a 
customized embedded Linux or other operating system. Additionally, 
ransomware exists for the smart phone operating systems including 
Android (72 percent market share as of 2020)322 and Apple iOS (27 
percent market share as of 2020).323, 324
During 2018–2019, there were dozens of local governments that 
were victimized by ransomware, including Atlanta, GA,325 Lakeland, 
FL,326 Fort Lauderdale, FL,327 several Louisiana parishes,328 and over 
20 local governments in Texas.329 According to the 2019 FBI Internet 
Crime Report, there were 2,047 instances of ransomware reported in 
that year.330 However, the number of reported cybercrimes may only 
represent 10 to 12 percent of the actual total number committed in 
the U.S. each year.331 Similar to the Maersk incident discussed previ-
ously in this monograph, the reason entire cities were affected by 
ransomware is that they used versions of Microsoft Windows known 
to have a vulnerability in its file sharing protocol—allowing a single 
infected computer to automatically infect other systems across the 
organization’s network. 
Cybersecurity Issues with Cloud Services. Private and public compa-
nies and organizations are increasingly using cloud services. Cloud 
services are on-demand services provided over the internet from the 
cloud provider’s servers, obviating the need for an organization to 
acquire and maintain their own servers and resulting in reduced costs 
of acquisition and maintenance. Some of the more well-known cloud 
service providers include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, 
Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud, and IBM Cloud. Cloud services range 
from software and storage on demand, all the way to providing a 
company with an entire IT infrastructure. Larger corporations relying 
on cloud services include Target, Walmart, Apple, General Electric, 
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Instagram, and Netflix.332 One of the largest entities moving toward 
use of the cloud is the DOD: 
In September 2017, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a 
memorandum calling for the accelerated adoption of a Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) enterprise-wide cloud services solution 
as a fundamental component of ongoing DoD modernization 
efforts.333
In 2018, the DOD published its DOD Cloud Strategy report, which 
recognized the need for updating warfighter support through innova-
tive technology, such as the cloud:
The Department of Defense (DoD) has entered the modern age 
of warfighting where the battlefield exists as much in the digital 
world as it does in the physical. Data and our ability to process 
data at the ready are differentiators to ensure mission success. 
Cloud is a fundamental component of the global infrastructure 
that will empower the warfighter with data and is critical to 
maintaining our military's technological advantage.334
The DOD’s growing use of the commercially available cloud services 
to store and process highly classified data may improve warfighting 
effectiveness and mission success, but it also provides an enormous 
and increasing attack surface for malign actors to compromise—either 
through external attacks or by malicious insiders employed by the 
cloud providers. Cloud security provider Armor identified 621 million 
attacks on cloud customers in 2018, including brute force password 
attacks, attacks against vulnerable software, web application attacks, 
and IoT attacks.335 
The futuristic HEO is situated on the battlefield with multiple IoBT 
devices and sensors feeding critical data to the warfighter, as well as 
an upstream to command for battlefield assessment. An IoBT device 
requires an update downloaded from a “secure” cloud server, and the 
update is applied; however, a malign insider has modified the update 
stored on the cloud server to include malicious code that encrypts 
files after a set period of time. Suddenly, IoBT sensors no longer func-
tion—as the operating system files have been encrypted—rendering the 
IoBT device inoperable. If these updates were automatically applied, 
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that would mean all IoBT devices would be susceptible to the attack 
as a matter of course.336 Or, the update contains malicious logic that 
causes sensors to transmit inaccurate data to the warfighter and to 
command, providing a false picture of the battlefield. On the hard-
ware side, an IoBT device may malfunction due to faulty components, 
but the OEM no longer manufacturers them, requiring the DOD to 
procure from an alternative source which may not be as well vetted as 
the OEM—increasing the potential for supply chain vulnerabilities. 
7. Disposal. Disposal involves the decommissioning and removal of 
a product at the end of its life.337 Hardware disposal involves disas-
sembly for reuse, recycling, or destruction, and software disposal 
includes uninstalling, deleting, or otherwise discontinuing the use of 
the product.338 Software disposal requires permanently removing all 
remnants of software and data from storage devices. 
Risks. The number one threat in the disposal stage can be caused by 
the lack of due diligence in not securely deleting sensitive files from 
a system’s storage device, usually a hard drive. The secure deletion 
process can be a complicated activity for non-technical users. All 
computing and electronic devices and media should be subjected to 
secure deletion procedures, including storage devices such as hard 
drives and external media such as flash drives, CDs, DVDs, etc., upon 
disposal.339 
The average person thinks that the act of deleting a file permanently 
removes that file; it does not. When a user deletes a file, all operating 
systems—regardless of the type of storage device—changes a single 
“flag” residing in the metadata of the file, and that flag informs the 
operating system that the storage space used by that file can now be 
reused if and when necessary.340 The original file will remain intact 
and is recoverable until overwritten by more data.341, 342 Anyone with 
a cyber forensics background can easily recover files deleted from a 
storage device. The most common way to securely delete a file is to 
overwrite that file with more data.343 Even with secure delete programs, 
research has shown that the effectiveness can be spotty, leaving traces 
of the original file.344 Governmental agencies, including the DOD and 
intelligence agencies, have their own guidelines for securely deleting 
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data—some of which include physical destruction of the device which 
stored highly sensitive information.345 
At some point in time, the HEO’s IoBT devices will become obso-
lete, permanently malfunction, or become degraded in some other way. 
Since these devices are likely to still store information, they will need 
to be disposed of securely. Note that disposal requires transportation 
to the location at which the systems will be disassembled, and stor-
age devices securely erased. During transportation, systems could be 
intercepted and data read from the devices. Also, the compiled code 
could be extracted and reverse engineered to determine how it func-
tions, which could then be used for future attacks by malign actors. 
Takeaways for the SOF Community
Much of the literature would suggest that supply chain attacks begin and 
end at acquisition and procurement. Clearly, this is an understandably 
myopic view of the possibilities of cyber compromise for a weapons or sup-
port system. Just as important are the manufacturing/development, use/
maintenance, and disposal stages of the product life cycle. As government 
regulations seek to improve mitigation strategies for cyber compromise 
during acquisition and procurement, they force malign actors to identify 
new attack vectors for the system compromise. Additionally, the expanded 
use of cloud services will create a concomitant increase of the DOD’s attack 
surface. The SOF community must be vigilant regarding the manufactur-
ing/development, use/maintenance, and disposal stages, ensuring that these 
stages are also covered by appropriate regulations and guidelines to reduce 
the likelihood of compromise. 
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Chapter 6. SOF Acquisition
As the threats and understanding of C-SCRM evolve, so does the DOD response to it. Two themes have emerged from recent updates. First, 
cybersecurity has been recognized as foundational and should be a consid-
eration across a products’ life cycle. Second, while SOF has long recognized 
the need for rapid acquisitions, the entire DOD is also moving towards 
more nimble acquisition processes. This section will review what makes 
SOF acquisition unique, and will discuss some of the evolving and emergent 
tools and processes that will assist SOF with C-SCRM moving forward.
SOF Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) 
The SOF community spans the globe, conducting critical missions and—
where the need for operational success is paramount—SOF operators use 
sophisticated and unique solutions.346 It is also imperative to get that equip-
ment to the operator quickly. James Guerts, a former United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) acquisition executive, summarized 
the SOF needs in January 2016: “Velocity is my combat advantage. Iteration 
speed is what I’m after, because if I can go five times faster than you, I can 
fail four times and still beat you to the target. … That's really what we're 
going after here.”347
 The SOF Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Center, established in 
1991, is responsible for all USSOCOM research, development, acquisition, 
procurement, and logistics. It works closely with industry, academia, and 
government to provide rapid and focused acquisition, technology, and logis-
tics support to warfighters.348 SOF AT&L consists of eight PEOs: Command, 
Control, Communications, and Computers; Fixed Wing; Maritime; Rotary 
Wing; SOF Digital Applications; SOF Support Activity; SOF Warrior; Ser-
vices; and Special Reconnaissance.349 There are also four Directorates: Comp-
troller; Logistics; Procurement; and Science & Technology.350 Underlying the 
mission is the SOF acquisition process, unique to the USSOCOM, which is 
more streamlined than other service branches, allowing for quick delivery 
of modern capabilities.351 The SOF AT&L accelerates its force and executes 
its mission by following four key acquisition principles:
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1. Delivers capability to the user expeditiously;
2. Exploits proven techniques and methods;
3. Keeps warfighters involved throughout the process; and
4. Takes risk and manages it.352
Recent changes announced by the DOD should also provide additional 
support for the acquisition velocity that is critical to SOF, as noted by the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment: “I’m very proud 
of our Adaptive Acquisition Framework, because I believe it enables DOD 
to simplify and speed up the acquisition process. The six different acquisi-
tion pathways provide flexibility to apply acquisition authorities and various 
contract types in a creatively compliant manner." Additional acquisition 
instructions that have also been updated, signed, and issued include DODI 
5010.44, Intellectual Property Acquisition and Licensing Policy; DODI 5000.74, 
Defense Acquisition of Services; DODI 500.80, Operation of Middle-tier of 
Acquisition; and DODI 5000.81, Urgent Capability Acquisition and Software 
Acquisition Interim Policy. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Sustainment noted that the DOD was close to finishing 
DODI 5000.01, Defense Acquisition Regulation.353
Another mechanism that allows SOF to be responsive in meeting mission 
needs is through Other Transaction Agreements, sometimes referred to as 
OTAs.354 OTAs provide the flexibility to incorporate commercial industry 
best practices and standards into awards to develop innovative solutions 
using both traditional and non-traditional defense contractors as OTAs 
are easily tailorable.355 There are three types of OTA agreements: research, 
prototype, and production. OTAs are not Federal Acquisition Regulation-
based procurement contracts, nor are they considered grants, cooperative 
agreements, or cooperative research and development agreements.356 OTAs 
historically were seldom used, however in the last few years they have become 
much more prevalent in DOD acquisitions.357 The SOFWERX organization, 
for example, use OTAs as one of their contracting methods.358
SOFWERX
Another way to address future warfighter needs with innovative solutions is 
through the SOFWERX organization. The SOFWERX platform was created 
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to solve warfighter challenges through a Partnership Intermediary Agree-
ment between USSOCOM and DEFENSEWERX and is a public facing emis-
sary. SOFWERX describes its mission as two-fold: “1) Create and maintain a 
platform to accelerate delivery of innovative capabilities to USSOCOM and 
2) Facilitate capability refinement through exploration, experimentation and 
assessment of promising technology.”359 SOFWERX brings together different 
entities including government, labs, industry, and academia. SOFWERX 
showed how they bring these different entities together to solve future warf-
ighter problems during one recent event—the Innovation Foundry—held on 
10–12 March 2020, which was designed to help USSOCOM identify future 
capabilities areas for Unconventional Warfare for further technical explora-
tion.360 Within SOFWERX is the Foundry, a workshop for rapid prototyping 
and provides tools such as 3D printers, welding, and grinders among other 
manufacturing tools.361 
SOFWERX also has a responsive acquisition process to rapidly field solu-
tions for warfighters. For example, one event involved Science and Technol-
ogy Small Business Innovation Research 20.1 Phase I—which solicited grant 
applications and proposals to address needs related to a platform agnostic 
data storage infrastructure and Multi-Full Motion Video Fusion 3D capabil-
ity—among other topics.362 The event outcomes demonstrate the commit-
ment to speed, as proposals were evaluated within 30 days and the Small 
Business Innovation Research evaluation team anticipates contract awards 
within 90 days.363 
Additional Tools and Processes for Incorporating Cybersecurity 
in Acquisition
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) created a tool and associated train-
ing called the Cybersecurity and Acquisition Lifecycle Integration Tool 
(CALIT) to help program and acquisition professionals understand cyber-
security across a product’s life cycle.364 CALIT provides a visual way to 
understand how these processes interact in order develop cyber-resilient 
weapon systems.365
The DOD’s Cyber Security and Information Systems Information Analy-
sis Center developed a detailed chart that visually depicts the myriad of 
government-issued cybersecurity-related policies and regulations.366 The 
DOD Cybersecurity Chart identifies the numerous applicable cybersecurity 
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policies to visually organize and simplify the information. The chart covers 
different cybersecurity activities or requirements, such as Secure Data in 
Transit or Strengthen Cyber Readiness, and are organized under five main 
categories: Organize, Enable, Anticipate, Prepare, and Authorities. The 
authorities section provides the legal authorities, policies, operational and 
subordinate documents that apply.367 
In 2019, the DOD released DOD Enterprise DevSecOps Initiative, a new 
initiative to shift software to faster and more secure development processes.368 
Development, Security, and Operations (DevSecOps) combines industry best 
practices to create responsive and secure Government software factories. 
Under DevSecOps, automated standards, tools, and services will permit 
the rapid development, deployment, and operations of software applications 
which are interoperable, flexible, and secure.369 Additionally, DevSecOps uses 
a cloud environment permitting the DOD to develop and share capabilities 
seamlessly. This approach allows small businesses to operate within a secure 
government environment rather than establishing their own cybersecurity 
infrastructures. This potentially could help alleviate concerns about the 
CMMC being a barrier to entry for small businesses. 
A companion document to DevSecOps is planned for release that will 
incorporate security language understandable to auditors who are assigned 
with accrediting software.370 A key recognition in the new initiative is that 
the DevSecOps approach will help remedy the issue in legacy software 
development practices where cybersecurity has not been a primary con-
cern. DevSecOps shifts incorporating cybersecurity throughout the software 
development process—from separate, discrete functions to a cross-functional 
model—where these skill sets work in parallel using a continuous monitoring 
approach.371 With DevSecOps, cybersecurity is continuously monitored and 
applied across the software’s life cycle. 
The DOD released OSD DevSecOps Best Practice Guide Version 1.0, dated 
15 January 2020, to assist in the transition to DevSecOps.372 This best practice 
guide aids the DOD shifting to DevSecOps, focusing not only on the tech-
nical aspects of software development, but the necessity of “organizational 
cultural changes” that must occur for its successful implementation. While 
it is reasonable to conclude that a culture changes slowly—and that DOD, as 
a whole, may take time to transition—the changes that are occurring and the 
tools that are available can help SOF continue to respond to the mission: sup-
porting the warfighters current and future needs with acquisitions that can 
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be supported at the appropriate velocity with products and solutions that are 
delivered uncompromised in order to help the SOF achieve mission success.
Takeaways for the SOF Community
The current SOF acquisition process is unique across the military services. 
Speed and responsiveness to warfighter needs are important goals. SOF 
AT&L and SOFWERX provide SOF with the ability to rapidly respond to 
emergent threats and crises. The introduction of DevSecOps is likely to 
reduce the attack surface for software, as cybersecurity is no longer an after-
thought as with legacy software development, but a required component 
where security is given its due from the beginning of design all the way 
through the software development life cycle. Additionally, tools such as the 
DAU’s CALIT and the DOD Cybersecurity Chart provide additional assis-
tance to acquisition personnel in assisting in understanding cybersecurity 
and acquisition regulations. 
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Conclusions and the Future of SOF 
Acquisition
As the Maersk incident illustrates, cyberattacks can have tremendous real-world consequences on the supply chain—consequences that could 
have profound implications for mission success if delivery of needed supplies, 
equipment, and information is disrupted. SOF rely on increasingly sophis-
ticated hardware and software-driven products, such as the IoBT, which 
leaves warfighters vulnerable to an increasingly large attack surface. Current 
and future warfighting technologies will use even more diverse technolo-
gies and components—sourced from global tiered supply chains—making 
it difficult to ascertain the authenticity of parts and the cyber-resiliency of 
components, parts, and software. As such, the attack surface is only likely 
to increase in the future. 
Shifts to the DOD’s acquisition strategies have also made it increas-
ingly difficult to determine cyber risks in products and software. The shift 
from traditional program-specific products and manufactured systems to a 
strategy of using more COTS products—alone, or incorporated into other 
products—leaves SOF with reduced insight and control into the design and 
development process of lower-tier suppliers. The benefits of the global supply 
chain—such as interoperability, and rapid innovation—are all benefits that 
also threaten the cyber-resilience of products. All these factors combine 
to present SOF with potential supply chain vulnerabilities through either 
intentional acts by malign actors, or unintentional acts by suppliers with the 
potential to negatively impact mission outcomes. 
The SOF supply chain is under increasing threats of cyber compromise, as 
modern warfare has moved to blended operations. The potential for military 
disruptions is high, as malign actors continue to use multiple threat vectors. 
Attack vectors include the supply chain, cyber-physical systems, cyber IT, 
and the human domain. Human domain attacks are perniciously malicious; 
they take advantage of weaknesses in the psychology of humans, which can 
only be mitigated through training, education, and awareness programs, 
combined with healthy doses of vigilance and skepticism. 
The notion of cyber-resiliency through C-SCRM is evolving to manage 
cybersecurity risks in the supply chain. While initially focused on IT 
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cybersecurity, over the last 20 years C-SCRM has evolved into a blended 
discipline of cybersecurity, SCM, and risk management. Just as the academic 
literature has evolved in their understanding of C-SCRM, so has the gov-
ernment’s—and, more specifically, the DOD’s understanding of C-SCRM. 
Managing the supply chain to ensure products are delivered uncompromised 
is critical to SOF mission success. As the DOD transitions to DODI 5000.02, 
Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, greater importance has 
been placed on cybersecurity being a foundational element throughout the 
acquisition process, which specifically addresses that program managers 
need to recognize cybersecurity as a critical part of program planning. DODI 
5000.CS, Cybersecurity for Acquisition Decision Authorities and Program 
Managers, a forthcoming policy identified in DODI 5000.02, is intended 
to provide guidance for acquisitions and program managers on managing 
cybersecurity in acquisitions. The CMMC defines cybersecurity as a foun-
dational element for suppliers, requiring third-party assessors to evaluate 
suppliers—and it is a way forward for the DOD to manage cyber supply chain 
risks. The emergent CMMC guidelines will ensure that the DOD has greater 
assurances that the government’s FCI and CUI data will be protected in the 
supply chain—as CMMC levels will be specified in RFIs and RFPs—with 
firms needing to be certified at the level specified to be competitive. The 
requirement for a certain certification level will flow down from primes to 
subcontractors as well, putting a greater onus on prime and subcontractors 
to be responsible for their supplier’s cybersecurity posture.
Concerns exist about the implementation of the CMMC—and given 
that it is emerging, some questions are still outstanding. Concerns do exist 
about the size and number of companies needing auditing and number of 
assessors needed to conduct the certifications. The expense of accreditation 
that companies pay for is of concern, especially for small businesses. With 
the current structure, there is no oversight to determine the fairness of an 
evaluation. Legal questions still exist, e.g., what happens if a certification is 
lost by a contractor in the middle of contract performance, or what if the 
inability to bid on future programs is lost.
SOF AT&L has strategically used legacy acquisition strategies to ensure 
speed of delivery of products needed to support the warfighter. The DOD 
transition to the DODI 5000.02, Adaptive Acquisition Framework should 
allow the SOF community new methods to ensure that mission critical 
products can be acquired and delivered quickly and securely. Further, the 
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adoption of the CMMC into the acquisition process ensures that cybersecu-
rity is foundational in a product’s life cycle. It is reasonable to conclude that 
while the CMMC was designed to protect FCI and CUI, the more mature 
and advanced an organization’s cybersecurity posture is, the more likely that 
other cybersecurity threats—not related to FCI and CUI—can be mitigated 
or prevented. The new emphasis on product life cycle cybersecurity, manage-
ment of the supply chains, and more responsive acquisitions within DOD 
itself will strengthen SOF’s ability to more quickly deliver uncompromised, 
mission-critical products needed by SOF warfighters.
All these measures paint the picture that the DOD is moving toward 
a holistic life cycle approach to managing cyber supply chain risks. The 
DOD is shifting its posture on cybersecurity from one where cybersecurity 
is often an afterthought in products to being a foundational element incor-
porated throughout a products life cycle. The CMMC is intended to ensure 
that cyber threats and risks in the supply chain are managed and there are 
adequate controls to protect FCI and CUI. The government is also taking a 
more secure and agile approach to software products by creating DevSecOps 
factories for software development—which permits speedier development 
than legacy methods—but on a more secure foundation. These changes, 
when used together, demonstrate how all of these policies can work together 
to manage cyber supply chain risks across a product’s life cycle.
Given the recent release of new and emergent regulations, it would appear 
one recommendation moving forward is training, education, and aware-
ness for all those involved in a product’s life cycle, not just acquisition or 
cybersecurity professionals. Training could also be tailored to specific end-
user groups. In addition to training, tools that help end-users conceptualize 
cybersecurity and C-SCRM could be updated to reflect these changes. For 
example, CALIT, which shows how cybersecurity fits along a product’s life 
cycle, could be updated to reflect the new policies and instructions. Likewise, 
the DOD Cybersecurity Chart—which is a valuable resource to categorize 
and map the various policies—could be updated and is a valuable tool to 
demonstrate the “big picture” as to how all regulations fit into the product 
life cycle. A highly educated workforce can provide knowledgeable profes-
sionals for acquisition teams and help ensure that cybersecurity risks in the 
supply chain can be addressed throughout a product’s life cycle. 
C-SCRM is still a new and fluid discipline, requiring continued revisions 
to keep abreast of changing technologies and cybersecurity threats to the 
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global supply chain. Now that a more collective understanding of C-SCRM 
is emerging, it will hopefully be easier to measure and test the effectiveness 
of these new standards. More research will permit the DOD, government, 
industry partners, and academia to continue to improve the defenses against 
malign actors wishing to harm the operational readiness and ability to suc-
cessfully complete the mission for both the SOF warfighter and the DOD 
as a whole.
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Acronyms
AT&L  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
BEC  business email compromise
C-SCRM cyber supply chain risk management
CALIT  Cybersecurity and Acquisition Lifecycle Integration Tool
CEO  chief executive officer
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CIO  chief information officer
CMMC  Capability Maturity Model Certification
CNCI  Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 
CNSSI  Committee on National Security Systems Instruction
COTS  commercial off-the-shelf
CPS  cyber-physical system
CPU  Central Processing Unit
CUI  Controlled Unclassified Information
DAU  Defense Acquisition University
DevSecOps Development, Security, and Operations
DFARS  Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DHS  United States Department of Homeland Security
DIACAP DOD Information Assurance Certification and  
  Accreditation Process
DIB  Defense Industrial Base
DOD  Department of Defense 
DODI  DOD Instruction
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EAC email account compromise
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCI Federal Contract Information
FCC Federal Communications Commission 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GB gigabyte 
HEO hyper-enabled operator 
ICT information communications technology
IoBT Internet of Battlefield Things
IoT Internet of Things 
IP internet protocol
IRS U.S. Internal Revenue Service
IT information technology
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
OT operational technology
OTA other transaction agreement
OEM original equipment manufacturer
PEO Program Executive Office
PPE personal protective equipment
R&D research and development
RFI request for information
RFID radio frequency identification tags
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RFP  Request for Proposal
RMF  Risk Management Framework
SCM  supply chain management
SMB  server management board
SOF  Special Operations Forces
USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command 
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